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We describe a simple model of heterogeneous, interacting agents making decisions between n ≥ 2
discrete choices. For a special class of interactions, our model is the mean field description of
random-field Potts-like models, and is effectively solved by finding the extrema of the average en-
ergy E per agent. In these cases, by studying the propagation of decision changes via avalanches,
we argue that macroscopic dynamics is well-captured by a gradient flow along E. We focus on
the permutation-symmetric case, where all n choices are (on average) the same, and spontaneous
symmetry breaking (SSB) arises purely from cooperative social interactions. As examples, we show
that bimodal heterogeneity naturally provides a mechanism for the spontaneous formation of hier-
archies between decisions, and that SSB is a preferred instability to discontinuous phase transitions
between two symmetric points. Beyond the mean field limit, exponentially many stable equilibria
emerge when we place this model on a graph of finite mean degree. We conclude with speculation
on decision making with persistent collective oscillations. Throughout the paper, we emphasize
analogies between methods of solution to our model and common intuition from diverse areas of
physics, including statistical physics and electromagnetism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
People have long imagined connections between social
decision making problems and disordered spin systems
in physics [1–4]. Many models [4–13] have showed that
the most basic binary decision making problems exhibit
a variety of interesting behavior such as phase transitions
and “glassy” behavior, with emphasis often placed on the
random field Ising model [4, 6] for its simplicity. One of
the long-term goals of these works is to provide toy mod-
els for a variety of social phenomena that are notoriously
challenging to explain using the traditional language of
economics. The most basic example is the interpreta-
tion of market crashes as discontinuous phase transitions,
which naturally arise in spin models placed under exter-
nal magnetic fields; the spins represent the agents in the
market, and the external magnetic field represents some
external “market forces” that drive these agents towards
a specific decision.
However, one aspect of decision making which has been
mostly taken for granted is the possibility that there are
more than two choices to make. With few exceptions
[14–17, 19], in general this possibility has been assumed
to be well approximated by the binary decision making
case. Even in these papers, there is very little analytic de-
velopment of a theory of n-ary decision making, as there
has been in the binary decision literature. A first step to-
wards analytic development of a theory was taken in [18],
in a very simple toy model describing the dynamics of a
ranking system, although only at the macroscopic level; a
case with only ranking preferences considered is given in
[19]. There, an interesting alternative multiple-decision
making approach was presented in a rigorous statistical
framework.
In this paper, we write down a simple model for deci-
sion making between interacting, heterogeneous agents
choosing between n possible options. The agents are
forced to pick exactly one option, in contrast with [14],
e.g. We show that for a wide variety of social interactions,
the mean field limit of the model is equivalent to a gener-
alized class of random-field Potts models. In this case, we
will argue that essentially all static and dynamic aspects
of the model, at mean field level, can be understood by
determining a mean-field energy functional. This allows
us to make strong statements about the resulting phase
diagram and dynamics of the model, under a wide variety
of random fields and initial conditions.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
introduce our decision model from the viewpoint of lo-
cal utility maximization, under the assumption that the
utilities are dependent on both an ”intrinsic” component
and a ”social” component dependent on the actions of
others. From that we describe a generic framework for
understanding equilibria in terms of an energy function
E. Section III re-derives a large class of these models
from the microscopic Hamiltonian approach of statistical
physics. To make our results more concrete, we present
some simple solutions of our model in Section IV. In Sec-
tion V we argue that the dynamics of our model is cap-
tured by a gradient flow on this energy function E, and
in Section VI we discuss patterns of spontaneous sym-
metry breaking (SSB), whose general introduction can
be found in Appendix F. In Section VII we discuss the
emergence of many solutions to the equations of state be-
yond the mean field limit, and discuss finite size effects
in Section VIII. We conclude with a speculative discus-
sion of a scenario without a globally defined energy that
exhibits persistent oscillations in Section IX.
II. THE MODEL
Suppose that we have a collection of N agents, each
represented by nodes α = 1, . . . , N on a graph. Each
agent has to make a choice between n possible options,
and we call that choice xα ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For instance, the
agents may represent voters in an election, or consumers
deciding between different social media platforms, smart-
phones or other sets of goods belonging to the same niche.
The key premise in our model is that each agent always
selects the choice he deems to have the highest total util-
ity. The total utility is the sum of two components, the
intrinsic utility and the social utility. For agent α and
choice i, we write
Vα,i = Uα,i + fi(q
α
1 , . . . , q
α
n) (1)
where Vα,i, Uα,i and fi respectively represent the total,
intrinsic and social utilities, and qαi is the fraction of
neighbors of node α that subscribe to choice i. As in pre-
viously proposed decision-making models like [7], the so-
cial utility depends only on the relative number of agents
who prefer some choices over others. For most of this pa-
per, we will focus on the mean-field limit where the graph
is complete, i.e. that qαi is independent of α. Henceforth,
we shall use the vector notation ~q = (q1, ..., qn), without
the α index.
Of course,
n∑
i=1
qi = 1. (2)
3Along with the constraint that qi ≥ 0 for each i, this de-
fines a space commonly called the (n − 1)-dimensional
simplex.1 It enjoys a large discrete symmetry group
called the permutation group Sn: the space looks identi-
cal if we permute the labels i.
The intrinsic utility Uα,i encompasses all heterogeneity
considerations among agents that do not depend on the
choices of other agents, such as price or software relia-
bility. It is a quenched random variable with cumulative
distribution function (CDF)
Fi(u) ≡ P(Uα,i < u). (3)
We assume that the agents α always choose the option
with the highest total utility:
xα = i if Vα,i > Vα,j for all i 6= j. (4)
Since we will assume that Vα,i are continuous parame-
ters, almost surely we will never have Vα,i = Vα,j for
i 6= j, and we neglect this possibility from here on out.
We will also assume for this paper that Vα,i and Vα,j
are uncorrelated for each i 6= j. In practice, this may
be a bad assumption, but it will allow us to take advan-
tage of more powerful analytic tools. There are many
other threshold models where agents only change after
pushed past some critical threshhold, dependent on the
action of others [7, 8, 20–22] – see also the fiber bundle
model [23, 24]. Most of the above works emphasize the
possibility that social interaction can alter the phase dia-
gram, with phase transitions characterized by avalanches
of macroscopically many state changes; the model we de-
scribe will exhibit such features too, as we shall rigorously
derive.
So far, we have made no assumptions on the forms of
the intrinsic utility CDFs Fi(u), nor those of the social
utility functions fi. Indeed, our model is valid for the
most generic case where these utility functions are non-
linear, and different for each choice. For instance, we
can model a situation where the market consists of both
normal goods and luxury goods, the latter whose utility
increases the more expensive and uncommon it becomes.
We have not included any noise in the model at this
point. As such, we expect this class of models to be a
poor description of say, stock trades, which can occur
on rapid time scales and are characterized by noisy dy-
namics. Instead, we expect this class of models to be
better suited for studying decision making which occurs
on longer time scales – say, in the market between two
different types of cars, or different neighborhoods to live
in.
In the limit where interactions are negligible, this
model can be used as a “microscopic justification” for
classical economics, as follows. Suppose that a good in
1 This can be thought of as the generalization of the triangle n = 2,
or tetrahedron n = 3.
a marketplace is being sold at price p. For simplicity,
let us assume that there are only two choices, and that
choice 2 provides no utility: F2(u) = Θ(u). We are free
to choose2 Uα1 = Uα0−p, where Uα0 is the intrinsic util-
ity of the good at price p = 0. If F1(u) is the CDF of
Uα0, then we conclude that the fraction of buyers (agents
in state 1) at price p, the demand curve q1(p), is given by
q1(p) = F0(p). The existence of a single-valued demand
curve is equivalent to the statement that there is an (ef-
fective) description of agents who are non-interacting.
But as we will emphasize repeatedly in this paper, the
presence of social interactions generically destroys this
picture: demand becomes a multi-valued function [10].
In general, we can obtain the mean field (MF) equilibria
~q by self-consistently solving the equations above. Since
Fi(u) ≡ P(Uα,i < u), we have
P(Vα,i < u) = P(Uα,i < u− fi) = Fi(u− fi) (5)
Hence the MF equilibria can be obtained by integrating
over all possible values u that the most desirable choice
could be, multiplied by the probability that that choice
is i and the value of all other choices is smaller:
qi = P(xα = i)
=
∫
P(u < Vα,i < u+ du)
∏
j 6=i
P(Vα,j < u)
=
∫
du F ′i (u− fi(~q))
∏
j 6=i
Fj(u− fj(~q))
= − ∂
∂fi
∞∫
−∞
du
n∏
i=1
Fi(u− fi(~q)) (6)
The MF approximation becomes exact as N →∞.
Note that an overall uniform shift in the value of each
fi: fi → fi + a, does not change our model; only relative
social utilities matter. The MF equilibrium ~q can be
written in terms of a potential3
G(~q) ≡
∞∫
−∞
du
n∏
i=1
Fi(u− fi(~q)), (7)
via
qi = −∂G
∂fi
. (8)
For generic nonlinear functions ~f(~q), the derivative ∂/∂fi
may not be globally defined, as we discuss in Appendix
C.
2 This is because utility is not well-defined: utility functions u are
equivalent to f(u) if f is monotonically increasing (f ′ > 0).
3 The integral given by Eq. (7) is formally infinite, as
∏
i Fi → 1
for large u, but this infinity can be trivially regulated by replacing
the upper bound in the integral above by R, and taking the limit
R → ∞. As only derivatives of G enter the equation for ~q, the
overall linear coefficient R in G will be irrelevant for physical
calculations.
4III. THE HAMILTONIAN APPROACH
Now, we (a priori) start from a very different perspec-
tive, motivated from statistical physics. Let us imagine
that there is some global function: the Hamiltonian H,
which must be a local extremum at a stationary point
of the dynamics. For a social system, this is an unjusti-
fied assumption. Nonetheless, we will show that we can
recover a large class of ~f(~q) from this approach, so in
retrospect it may be reasonable, and so we proceed.
A microscopic Hamiltonian that can describe social de-
cision making is
H = −
∑
i
Uiαziα −
∑
n≥2,i1,...,in
A
(n)
i1···in
nNn−1
zi1α1 · · · zinαn .
(9)
where the indices α and i refer to the nodes and their
internal states respectively. ziα = 0 or 1, and satisfy the
constraint
n∑
i=1
ziα = 1. (10)
We interpret ziα = 1 as the state where node α is in state
i. The Uiα’s, which are ’single particle’ energies associ-
ated with node α being in state i, are random variables
which are drawn from the cumulative distribution func-
tion Fi(u), as in the previous section. The notation has
been chosen identically with the previous section because
we will shortly show that the Uiαs are playing an identi-
cal role. For the thermodynamic limit to be well-defined,
we require that A(n) are independent of N .
In the case where the only non-vanishing A(n) is A(2),
and A
(2)
ij = Aδij , the Hamiltonian we have written down
is simply the random field Potts model [25] on a complete
graph. The statement that our model lives on a complete
graph is, for introductory purposes, simply a complicated
way of saying that there is a contribution to H from every
single pair of agents. Later in the paper, we will discuss
physics on more complicated graphs, where not all agents
interacts with each other.
We can find local extrema of H by demanding that we
find a solution where there is no single agent α who can
lower H by changing the i for which ziα = 1. A sufficient
condition for this is that
ziα = 1 ⇐⇒ − ∂H
∂zjα
maximal for j = i. (11)
If we define, employing a summation convention on the
i’s,
H ≡ −
∑
n≥2
A
(n)
i1···in
n
qi1 · · · qin , (12)
fi ≡ −∂H
∂qi
=
∑
n≥2
A
(n)
ij2···jnqj2 · · · qjn , (13)
then noting that the sum over ziα/N over all agents α
tends to qi in the thermodynamic limit, we obtain that
Eq. (11) is equivalent to
ziα = 1 ⇐⇒ Ujα + fj maximal for j = i. (14)
This precisely corresponds to our defining equation for
the model in the previous section, which we derived by
an analogy to utility.
From the above equations, it is clear that a posi-
tive (negative) A(n)i1···in determines whether the sys-
tem prefers (does not prefer) the choices represented by
qi1 ,...,qin to be realized simultaneously. For instance, a
negative A
(2)
i1i2
implies that a higher market share for one
choice discourages the other choice from being taken up.
In the case of equal i1 and i2, the sign of A
(2) simply
determines whether the social utility of the choice is pos-
itive or negative.
We will essentially restrict our analysis to the case
where all A
(n)
i1···in > 0, and will comment on the oppo-
site case in Appendix C.
A. An Energy Function
There is a remarkably easy and intuitive way to find
the solutions to the mean field equation Eq. (14), given
that ~f = −∇qH. To see this, let us recall Eq. (8), which
states that ~q = −∇fG, for a scalar function G. Assuming
that the matrix ∂fi/∂qj is invertible everywhere, we can
re-write Eq. (8) as
0 = qi
∂fi
∂qj
+
∂G
∂qj
=
∂
∂qj
(G+ qifi)− δijfi. (15)
Using that ~f itself is a gradient, we see that the solutions
to our mean field equations precisely correspond to the
extrema of an “energy” function
E ≡ G+H+ qifi = G+H− qi ∂H
∂qi
. (16)
In the subsequent subsection, we shall see that E can
be physically interpreted as the microscopic Hamiltonian
H averaged over disorder:
E =
〈H〉
N
, (17)
up to a possible constant shift, with the averages taken
over the random intrinsic utilities Uiα.
It is tempting to identify the maxima of E with unsta-
ble mean field solutions, and the minima of E with stable
solutions. We will show later that, up to a subtlety asso-
ciated with cooperative (ferromagnetic) vs. antagonistic
(antiferromagnetic) interactions, this is indeed the case.
Furthermore, the dynamics will always drive the system
towards stable fixed points.
5B. Noise
Noise is an unavoidable feature of any realistic social
decision making process. Noise can take on a variety
of forms: individual uncertainty, noisy stock market dy-
namics, etc. It is important to stress, however, that noise
is qualitatively different than the random field disorder
Uiα – unlike Uiα, the presence of noise will tend to drive
people between different states over time.
Since we have a Hamiltonian framework for our model,
there is a natural way that we can state our ignorance
about the true state of the system, and of the noise driv-
ing it, by solving our model at finite temperature T .
Mathematically, this is a statement that we wish to find
the maximal entropy distribution consistent with knowl-
edge of the typical value of H, and thus remain “as un-
certain as possible” [26].
As usual, at finite temperature T , the probability of
being in any given state is proportional to e−H/T . Since
the change in the energy due to the change of agent α
into state i is given by Uiα + fi, the probability that a
node with given Ui will be in state i is given at mean
field level by
P(ziα = 1|Ujα) = e
(Ui+fi)/T∑
e(Uj+fj)/T
. (18)
Thus, qi is given by simply averaging the above equation
over disorder. In particular, we write
qi = −∂GT
∂fi
, (19)
where
GT ≡ −T
〈
log
(∑
e(Ui+fi)/T
)〉
U
(20)
with 〈· · · 〉U denoting disorder (but not thermal) aver-
ages.
The analogy with the function G defined previously is
not accidental:
lim
T→0
GT = −〈max
i
(Ui + fi)〉U . (21)
Taking the derivative of this with respect to fi, we find
that this is simply equal to the probability that Ui+fi is
maximal, which is precisely the fi derivative of our pre-
vious G function. Therefore, up to a (infinite) constant,
G = G0. It is now easy to derive Eq. (17):
〈H〉
N
= H−
〈∑
Uiα
ziα
N
〉
= H−
∑
qi〈Ui|Ui + fi maximal〉
= H+ qifi − 〈max(Ui + fi)〉
= H+G0 + qifi. (22)
We conclude that G0 + qifi can be interpreted as the
random-field-induced potential energy in the effective,
disorder-averaged Hamiltonian (at mean field level).
By replacing G with GT , we obtain the free energy
per spin, which should be an extremum in equilibrium at
finite temperature.
IV. SIMPLE EXAMPLES
A. Binary decision models (n = 2)
We first consider the case where each agent decides be-
tween n = 2 options, i.e. between two difficult products,
or whether to buy or not to buy a single product. For
simplicity, we shall use the latter interpretation below.
These models are extensively studied [4–13].
This potential description also leads to a simpler un-
derstanding of a similar binary-decision model discussed
in [11]. It enables one to graphically read off the stability
of a fixed point, and more importantly, generalizes very
easily to the case n > 2, as we will discuss in the next
subsection.
1. Homogeneous intrinsic utility
In this simplest scenario, each agent have exactly the
same, i.e. homogeneous intrinsic opinion on the value
of the product. Each buyer will be rewarded with an in-
trinsic utility of U0, and each non-buyer with zero utility.
This corresponds to CDFs
F1(u) = Θ(u− U0); F2(u) = Θ(u) (23)
where Θ(u) is the Heaviside function
Θ(u) ≡
{
1 u ≥ 0
0 u < 0
. (24)
Now, also suppose that ~f = ~q, i.e. each agent ascribes a
social utility to each choice proportionally to the fraction
of friends already subscribed to it. With ~q = (q1, q2) =
(q, 1−q), the options of buying/not buying will have total
utilities of
V1 = U0 + q; V2 = 1− q (25)
We are now ready to calculate the potential G(q). Sub-
stituting Eqs. (23) into Eq. (6), we obtain
G(q) =
∫
du F1(u− q)F2(u− (1− q))
=
∫
du Θ(u− (q + U0))Θ(u− (1− q))
= −max(q + U0, 1− q) + constant. (26)
The energy is
E(q) = G(q) +H(q)−
2∑
i=1
qi
∂H(q)
∂qi
= −max(q − U0, 1− q) + q
2 + (1− q)2
2
. (27)
6By inspection (or from Fig. 1), the local minima of
E(q) lie at q = 0 for U0 < −1, at q = 1 for U0 > 1, and
at both q = 0 and q = 1 for |U0| < 1.
This all-or-none behavior is easy to explain: Since ev-
ery agent has exactly the same intrinsic preferences and
are exposed to the same q, the fraction of friends buying,
they will definitely gravitate towards the same optimal
choice. For sufficiently small |U0|, the social utility dom-
inates and both q = 0 and q = 1 states are actually
local optima. This bistability implies that if U0 is time-
dependent, we can obtain hysteresis – which of the two
equilibria we are at depends on the previous behavior of
U0.
2. Variable social and intrinsic utilities
Here, we consider a more general scenario with n = 2
choices by introducing a spread to the intrinsic utility
distribution. We assume that the utility distribution is
unimodal – i.e. F ′(u) has a single maximum. Intuitively,
we imagine all agents have an identical utility U0 (as be-
fore) for choice 1, up to random noise which is equally
likely to increase or decrease utility. For qualitative pur-
poses, it suffices to replace the Θ function in Eq. 23 with
a logistic (Fermi-Dirac) distribution:
F ′(u) =
β
4
sech2
βu
2
. (28)
This distribution has a variance of (pi/3β)2; its CDF is
F (u) =
1
1 + e−βu
(29)
and is useful for analytical studies because an exact ex-
pression exists for its corresponding potential G(~q), for
any n (See Appendix A). Its “effective temperature”
T ≡ β−1 plays the role of heterogeneity in intrinsic
utilities, but we stress that the disorder is not thermal
in nature despite the suggestive notation – disorder is
quenched, and all agents have the same utility for all
time.
Also, we stress that while we will use intrinsic utilities
of the form Eq. 29 extensively in this work, our model
is applicable to all possible forms of the utility function,
including those with an arbitrary number of peaks, or
asymmetrical ones.
We may also generalize the social utilities fi to the
linear form
fi = biqi + ai (30)
where bi represents the strength of the social influence of
choice i, and ai a mean offset which can also be absorbed
into the intrinsic utility.
The potential G(~f(q)) can be obtained:
G = −f1e
βf1 − f2eβf2
eβf1 − eβf2 (31)
as derived in Appendix A. The energy E(q) has a re-
markably simple expression:
E(q) = G(q) +
b1q
2 + b2(1− q)2
2
= B
(
q2
2
+
q − C
eβ′(q−C) − 1
)
(32)
where C = A/B and β′ = βB, with B = b1 + b2 being
the total marginal social utility and A = b2 + a2− a1 the
effective intrinsic utility of choice 2 (perhaps represent-
ing the cost of choice 1). Evidently, the fixed points at
∇qE = 0 only depends on the two external degrees of
freedom C and β′, representing intrinsic imbalances and
effective market homogeneity respectively. In particular,
β, which is an intrinsic property of the agents, and B,
which characterizes their social interactions, play indis-
tinguishable roles in determining the positions of market
equilibria. In particular, we will use the ability to absorb
the overall strength of social interactions into a rescaling
of utilities frequently for the remainder of the paper, and
this will henceforth be done implicitly.
Since E ∼ q2 for large4 q, there exists either one unique
minimum or two minima and one (unstable) maximum in
between them. In the former case, the market will simply
gravitate towards the potential minimum. In the latter
case, the market will choose the minimum that exists in
the same basin of attraction.
In Fig. 1, we observe how the potential landscape
changes for different T ′ = 1β′ as U0 is increased from
0 to 1.2. As U0 increases, choice 1 become intrinsically
more favorable, and the energy landscape tilts in its fa-
vor accordingly. The onset of bistability and hysteresis is
set by the competition between quenched disorder T and
social forces B via β′ = B/T . While market heterogene-
ity (quenched disorder) tend to smooth out the poten-
tial landscape, social forces encourage ’market crashes’,
where one local minimum disappears and the state is
forced to ’roll down’ to another nearest one. The time it
takes for the crash to occur decreases as E(q) becomes
steeper, and will be examined in detail in Section V and
Appendix C.
It is particularly important to pay attention to the
permutation symmetric case where a2 = a1, and b2 =
b1. In this case, any deviation from the point q = 1/2
represents spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB), where
the agents collectively pick out one choice over the other,
even though both choices have the same intrinsic and
social utility functions. The phenomenon of SSB will
be further elaborated in Section IV B 1 on permutation
symmetric models.
4 Note, however, that physically relevant solutions lie within q ∈
[0, 1]
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FIG. 1: (Color Online) Plots of E(q) against q for relative
intrinsic utilities U0 corresponding to (a to d) 0, 0.3, 0.7, 1.2
(cases with negative U0 are related by mirror symmetry).
Here a1 − a2 = U0, and b1 = b2 = 1. Appearing in each
plot are the graphs with T ′ = 1
β′ = 0, 0.025, 0.08 and 0.2.
The red balls indicate local minima in the physically allowed
white region. As U0 is increased, the minima with larger
q (towards the right) become more favored, until only one
minimum eventually remains. In general, a larger T ′ ∝ σ
smooths out potential barriers, thereby undermining social
effects. Only when T ′ < 1
6
does bistability become a pos-
sibility. The curves for T = 0 reduces to those describing
the homogeneous case in previous subsection, where an all-
or-none situation prevails.
3. Nonlinear Logarithmic Utility Function
Here we briefly consider the case of a nonlinear utility
function
f1 = g1 log(q + δ), f2 = U0 (33)
with g1 a constant. Logarithmic utility functions feature
are commonly used to represent situations where it a defi-
ciency costs much more than it pays to have a surplus. In
particular, they are frequently used in economics because
they exhibit “diminshing returns” [27]: df1/dq > 0, but
d2f1/dq
2 < 0. U0 represents the fixed utility offset of
not buying the product. Let us suppose that δ  1. As
detailed in Appendix C 2 b, the contribution from δ can
be neglected for small δ, and we have
E(q) ≈ g1q + g1 log q − U0
(qg1e−U0)β − 1
, (34)
which is graphically analyzed in Fig. 2.
B. Ternary (n = 3) Decision Making
In this subsection we will consider examples of our
model with n = 3. Unlike the binary case, this case
has not received much attention in the literature. For
simplicity, we will assume the social utilities ~f = ~q for
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FIG. 2: (Color Online) The potential E(q) for the case of
a single logarithimic utility with δ = 10−4, with stable MF
solutions indicated by red balls. Left) g1 = 1, β = 3 and
U0 = 0,−0.5,−1,−1.5 for top to bottom, and Right) g1 =
2.5, β = 30 and U0 = 0,−1,−2,−3 from top to bottom.
In both scenarios, we see that the q → 0 limit is always a
local minimum; moreover, it is robust against the tunings of
parameters. This is a consequence of the extreme cost of
having q = 0 market share. Also, there is a local maximum
when f1 = f2, i.e. g1 log q = U0, although it can smoothed
out when T−1 = β is small. It demarcates two basins of
attraction, where either choice becomes more attractive. For
large g1 or β, the social utility dominates, and we have an
all-or-none (q = 0 or 1) scenario.
the remainder of this section. Details on the case with
more general ~f(~q) may be found in Appendix D.
1. Permutation Symmetric Case
In the permutation symmetric case,
F1(u) = F2(u) = F3(u) = F (u), (35)
so that the intrinsic and social utilities for all choices are
identically equal. Any deviation from the permutation
symmetric point q = 1/3 will thus represent spontaneous
symmetry breaking (SSB), where the agents collectively
pick out one choice over the others. SSB is an extremely
important aspect of any model of the decision making
process between interacting agents, especially with an
eye towards financial or economic applications. This is
because this represents a phenomenon entirely beyond
the classical theory of supply and demand. In particular,
SSB implies that a market with identical sellers selling
identical goods could still lead to a distorted marketplace
where sellers do not receive revenues in accordance with
the quality of their product, one of the most foundational
principles of competitive market theory. This point has
also been emphasized, e.g., in [4, 17]. See Appendix F for
an introduction to SSB and its consequences in physics.
We show the results in Figure 3. For easy plotting of
our results in a manifestly permutation symmetric man-
ner, we have used barycentric coordinates for the simplex,
defined by (x, y):
x+ iy = q1 + q2e
2pii/3 + q3e
4pii/3. (36)
The simplex 1 = q1 +q2 +q3 corresponds to the region in
between the three lines x = −1/2 and (x− 1) = ±√3y.
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(e)FIG. 3: (Color online.) We show the energy landscape E(x, y) for permutation symmetric ternary logistic F (u) with (a)
β = 4.1, (b) β = 3.9, (c) β = 3.6. Inset regions in the bottom right correspond to zooming in very close to the permutation
symmetric point. Darker shading corresponds to E smaller, and lighter shading to E larger. As β decreases below 4, the three
minima merge to form one permutation symmetric minimum at the center.
If F (u) is given by a logistic distribution, by plotting E
on the simplex, we numerically find a transition between
three different regimes. From Eq. (G2) and Appendix
D, for β > 4, the only minima of E correspond to per-
mutation symmetry broken points. However, for β just
smaller than 4, we find that although the permutation
symmetric point is stable, new minima arise in E which
break permutation symmetry. In particular, we find (for
example) that q1 > q2 = q3; there are 3 equivalent points
corresponding to which of the three choices is most pop-
ular. Analogously to the ferromagnetic phase of the Ising
model, these should be thought of as the same phase –
all physical properties of these states are identical under
the appropriate exchange of labels 1,2,3. In summary,
as β decreases through 4, there will be a discontinuous
phase transition to a permutation symmetric point. For
4− β & 0.3, we find that the only minimum of E on the
simplex is the permutation symmetric point, qi = 1/3.
In Section VI B we will argue that the SSB transition
for n > 2 is generically discontinuous.
2. More General Cases
Let us briefly discuss some cases where permutation
symmetry is broken by the intrinisic utilities Fi’s. One
simple example of this is that we take F1 and shift its
argument by a value p, so that F1(u) = F (u+ p). This p
may correspond to some sort of “price”, as we will discuss
in a later section. In particular, as p gets larger, then
choice 1 becomes less and less attractive to the agents.
As a concrete example, we take F (u) to be given by the
logistic distribution. What we find, as shown in Figure
4, is that the agents are rather sensitive to small changes
in p.
Another example is to take all Fi(u) given by the logis-
tic distribution, but to take β1 6= β2 = β3. In this case,
we numerically find that the most stable fixed points cor-
respond to the choices i with the smallest value of βi, as
shown in Figure 5. This can heuristically be explained
as follows: let us consider the limit where β1 is finite,
but β2 = · · · = βn =∞ (the argument is general for any
n ≥ 3). Then we can exactly compute
G = −Q− log
(
1 + eβ(q1−Q)
)
β
(37)
where Q ≡ max(q2, . . . , qn). Assuming permutation sym-
metry among i = 2, . . . , n, and using that (after taking
q-derivatives of G) (n − 1)Q + q1 = 1, we conclude q1
satisfies the equation
q1 =
1
1 + eβ(1−nq1)/(n−1)
. (38)
The left hand side of this equation is an increasing func-
tion of q1, but the right hand side is decreasing; there
is a unique solution. It is easy to check – e.g. by try-
ing q1 = 1/n – that the solution to this equation has
q1 > 1/n. In this simple limit, we see that heterogeneity
in choice 1 has broken permutation symmetry towards
choice 1. This heuristically explains how a choice with a
wide variety of intrisinic utilities may end up obtaining a
larger share of agents, even if the average utility gained
from that choice is no better.
A less rigorous, non-mathematical explanation of this
is that for a choice with a wider variety of intrinsic utili-
ties, most agents who are “pinned” by their strong opin-
ion to their favorite choice are in the state with more
heterogeneity. This pinning then encourages more of the
remaining agents to also adopt this choice.
V. STABILITY OF A FIXED POINT
We have seen repeatedly in our plots of the energy
E the disappearance and emergence of new local min-
ima and maxima as paramters are tuned. This is readily
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FIG. 4: (Color online.) The energy landscape E(x, y) when the average intrinsic utility of choice 1, in the SSB phase, differs by
an amount p. We use β = 4.1 and (a), p = 0.03, (b) p = −0.01 and (c)p = −0.052. Darker shading corresponds to E smaller,
and lighter shading to E larger. When there is a small positive ’price’ p attached to choice 1 in (a), a plateau develops near
the q1 corner of the simplex, hence heavily favoring the other two choices. As the price of choice 1 becomes more negative in
(b) and (c), the minimum of E tilts rapidly towards the choice 1 corner. Note that the requisite value of p to completely shift
the phase diagram is extremely tiny when compared to β−1 ≈ 0.25 – the typical spread in intrinsic utilities.
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FIG. 5: (Color online.) The energy landscape E(x, y) for logistic decision making with permutation symmetry broken by
distinct values of β for different choices. We take β2 = β3 for simplicity. (a) β1 = 6, β2 = 3.5, (b) β1 = 6, β2 = 2, and (c)
β1 = 2, β2 = 5. Darker shading corresponds to E smaller, and lighter shading to E larger. In cases (a) and (b), choice 1 is
much less heterogeneous, and we see that the minima shift towards favoring q2 and q3; the difference between (a) and (b) stems
from the fact that the permutation symmetric fixed point for the binary decision problem between q2 and q3 is unstable in (a),
and stable in (b). Plot (c) shows a strong skew of the minimum towards favoring q1 when choice 1 has more heterogeneity.
interpreted as the emergence of new phases, exactly anal-
ogous to phases such as liquid water vs. solid ice.
One of the most important questions is therefore – if we
are in a given phase, can this phase become unstable as
we tune a given parameter? If so, what is the endpoint
of the instability – where will the dynamics of opinion
changes drive the system? We will tackle these questions
in this section – first with macroscopic arguments based
on a linear stability analysis of the energy E, and then
justify these assumptions carefully by a microscopic anal-
ysis of the stochastic dynamics of individual agent state
changes.
For the next two sections, we will assume that5 ~f =
~q. This simplifies the presentation, although the logic
carries through to the general case.
A. Macroscopic Analysis
First, we discuss the properties of fixed points at the
macroscopic level of the effective energy. Consider some
fixed point ~q∗. We will subsequently show that this fixed
point is only stable if it is a local minimum of the energy
5 This is equivalent to assuming that we are studying the ferro-
magnetic random field Potts model.
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E. For now, let us explore macroscopic consequences.
Taylor expanding the energy around ~q∗: ~q = ~q∗ + δ~q:
E ≈ E(~q∗) + 1
2
∑
i
δq2i −
∑
i,j
1
2
αijδqiδqj + O(δq
3), (39)
where we have defined
αij ≡ − ∂
2G
∂qi∂qj
. (40)
Using the definition of G, we find that αij < 0 if i 6= j.6 If
we evaluate the matrix αij at an extremum of the energy,
then the constraint that dynamics are constrained to the
simplex implies that
n∑
i=1
αij = 0, (41)
which also gives us αii > 0. Note that αij is a symmetric
matrix whose eigenvalues are therefore all real.
If we consider the dynamics of our system in real time,
the simplest possible guess is that the dynamics are gov-
erned by relaxation to the “ideal” value of ~q, −∂G/∂fi
(see Eq. (8));7 denoting q˙i ≡ dqi/dt,
q˙i = −∂G
∂fi
− qi. (42)
This differential equation is more carefully justified in
Section V C. With ~f = ~q here, we can also rewrite this as
q˙i = −∂E
∂qi
. (43)
In this special case of interactions, we see that the dy-
namics can be written as a gradient flow, whereby the
system relaxes to a local minimum of the energy. This is
analogous to Allen-Cahn relaxational dynamics [28].
We will argue in the next subsection that the gradient
flow behavior is indeed sensible from a microscopic per-
spective; in Appendix C, we shall also show that gradient
flow dynamics also holds for more general ~f(~q), but in a
different “coordinate system” ~q → ~γ(~q), with Eq. (43)
replaced by Eq. (C3).
Assuming Eq. (43), and ~f = ~q, if we linearize the
energy near a fixed point, we find that
δq˙i = αijδqj − δqi. (44)
Evidently, if the eigenvalues of αij are all smaller than 1,
the fixed point is stable, and if any eigenvalue is larger
than 1, the fixed point is unstable. Near a phase transi-
tion, when an eigenvalue of αij tends to 1, the dynamics
will experience critical slowing down, as per usual.
We can also view the gradient flow in Eq. (43) as anal-
ogous to the motion of a massless, positively charged par-
ticle in a viscous medium due to the “electric potential”
E. This electric potential can be visualized as arising
from a background charge density ρ, obtained via Pois-
son’s equation
−ρ = ∇2E = n+
∫
du
n∑
i=1
F ′′i (u− qi)
∏
j 6=i
Fj(u− qj)
= n−
∑
i
αii (45)
We see there is a uniform, constant contribution to ρ,
arising from the contribution H + ~q · ~f , and a variable
contribution to G. In particular, it is readily seen from
Eq. (45) that the contribution to ρ from G can be inter-
preted as a weighted density of the likelihood that agents
are about to switch their state.
Since αii ≥ 0 for any i, the contribution to the charge
density from G is always opposite to the constant nega-
tive background charge. The competition between posi-
tive and negative charge densities therefore leads to the
shape of E. One implication of this is that as β → ∞,
G(~f(~q)) becomes sharper (Eq. (A7)) and pushes the min-
ima of E away from the center of the simplex. In other
words, a more homogeneous intrinsic utility favors more
strongly distorted outcomes, in agreement with the intu-
ition that more homogeneous agents are more susceptible
to social influence.
B. Avalanches and a Microscopic Perspective on
Stability
In order to justify the assertions above, we now discuss
the dynamics of avalanches. By avalanche, we mean the
following: suppose that a single agent changes his state.
Subsequently, the values of Ui + fi change for the other
nodes, and therefore other nodes may also change their
state. This leads to a cascade of state changes, which
we call an avalanche. We stress that the calculation be-
low requires the assumption that, before the first agent
changed his state, the system was at a fixed point. This
calculation is a generalization of similar results in the
n = 2 case in [11] – see Appendix E, and is quite similar
to work done on the fiber bundle model [24].
Let us compute the probability that any given agent
switches from state i to j, given that we alter the prob-
ability distribution from qi to qi + δi:
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P(i→ j) =
∫ n∏
i=1
duiF
′
i (ui)
∏
k 6=i
Θ(ui + qi − uk − qk)
∏
l 6=j
Θ(uj + qj + δj − ul − ql − δl)
=
∞∫
−∞
duiF
′
i (ui)
ui+qi−qj∫
ui+qi−qj−max(0,δj−δi)
dujF
′
j(uj)
∏
k 6=i,j
Fk (min(ui + qi, uj + qj + δj − δk)− qk) . (46)
The first line in this expression is simply the statement that Ui + qi is maximal before the change in the probability
distribution, and Uj + qj + δqj is maximal after the change. In the second line, we combined pairs of Heaviside Θ
functions involving uk and integrated over uk; we also noted that the presence of a pair of Θ functions involving
ui − uj allows us to perform the uj integral as well. Note that P(i→ j) > 0 if and only if δj > δi.
Suppose further that only a finite number of agents change their state during the entire avalanche. In this case, we
can do a Taylor expansion of Eq. (46). In particular, if we are doing a Taylor expansion around ~δ = ~0, then the only
possible contribution at first order comes from the Taylor expansion of the lower integrand on uj – at leading order,
the upper and lower bound are equal:
P(i→ j) ≈
∞∫
−∞
duiF
′
i (ui)(−max(0, δj − δi))
F ′j(u) ∏
k 6=i,j
Fk(u)

u=ui+qi−qj
. (47)
Using the definition of αij we conclude
P(i→ j) ≈ (−αij) max(0, δj − δi), (48)
where we have used the definition of αij as a second
derivative of G, and the fact that the integrand may be
evaluated at ~δ = ~0, to obtain this answer. Pleasingly, we
see that αij admits a microscopic interpretation as the
likelihood of state changes during an avalanche.
Given this linearized approximation near a fixed point,
let us study the dynamics of avalanches. This is similar
to theory of multi-type branching processes [29], though
with some important differences beyond first moments.
We work at a series of discrete time steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
and denote with Zti the change in the number of agents
who are in state i, during time step t. Note that
n∑
i=1
Zti = 0, (49)
and so Zti can be negative. We can write
Zti =
∑
j 6=i
(
W tji −W tij
)
(50)
where W tij is the number of nodes which will flip from i
to j during time step t. Based on the independence of
the utilities of each node, we find that, defining
Y tij ≡ max(0, Ztj − Zti ), (51)
P(W t+1ij = k) ≈
(
N
k
)(
|αij |
Y tij
N
)k (
1− |αij |
Y tij
N
)N−k
≈
(|αij |Y tij)k
k!
e−|αij |Y
t
ij . (52)
The distribution of W t+1ij is thus Poisson with mean |αij |Y tij .
Suppose that −Z0i = Z0j = 1 (i.e., the avalanche begins by a single node flipping from i to j). We obtain that
〈Zt+1i |t〉 =
∑
j 6=i
〈W t+1ji −W t+1ij |t〉 = −
∑
j 6=i
αij
(
Zti − Ztj
)
=
n∑
j=1
αijZ
t
j (53)
where 〈· · · |t〉 means expectation values conditioned on the information of all state changes up to time t. We only
12
have to consider state changes that occured at time step
t to compute Zt+1i because of the linearity of Eq. (48)
– only events that happen in the previous time step can
lead to a change that would not have occurred previously.
In the last step, we employed Eq. (41). We arrive at the
nice result
〈Zti 〉 =
(
αt
)
ik
Z0k (54)
where αt is the tth power of the matrix α. In retrospect,
we do not really need to know the Poisson statistics of
W tij to determine Eqs. (53) and (54). They also follow
from the fact that this stochastic process is Markovian
(the statistics at time t+ 1 only depend on the value at
time t).
If the largest eigenvalue of α is smaller than 1, the
avalanche almost surely has finite size. The total change
Xi in the number of agents in state i, given by
Xi =
∞∑
t=0
Zti (55)
has expected value
〈Xi〉 = (1− α)−1ik Z0k . (56)
This expression will be divergent as soon as the first
eigenvalue of 1 − α tends to 0. Such a divergence cor-
responds to the onset of instability.
C. Real Time Dynamics
There is a natural alteration of the microscopic dynam-
ics described above which possesses a simple continuum
limit. Let us consider a given agent α. Suppose that α’s
preferred state is j, but xα(t) = i. Then we assume that
in a discrete time step of size ∆τ , the probability of α
transferring from i to j is given by ∆τ . If ∆τ = 1, then
we recover the dynamical rules of the previous subsec-
tion. If ∆τ < 1, then
P(xα(t+ ∆τ) = j) =
{
1 xα(t) = j
∆τ xα(t) 6= j , (57a)
P(xα(t+ ∆τ) = i 6= j) =
{
1−∆τ xα(t) = i
0 xα(t) 6= i . (57b)
In the limit ∆τ → 0, we may treat t as a continuous
variable, and these update rules reduces to the differen-
tial equation
d
dt
P(xα = i) = δij − P(xα = i). (58)
Averaging over all nodes α, Eq. (58) becomes
q˙i = P(i optimal)− qi (59)
which is simply Eq. (42).
VI. PERMUTATION SYMMETRIC MODELS
In this section, we shall perform a more detailed study
on permutation symmetric models, which correspond to
Fi(u) ≡ F (u) (60)
for each i. These are the simplest models to analyze, and
they turn out to be interesting in their own right. It is
straightforward to see that the permutation group Sn,
whose action interchanges the labels on qi, is a symme-
try of the energy E. The most obvious question then be-
comes: under what conditions (and to what subgroups)
does the permutation symmetry spontaneously break.
Correspondingly, when will interacting agents sponta-
neously begin to prefer certain choices over others, de-
spite the fact that they are all inherently the same?8
This will be the main theme of this section. Although a
real world market may not have permutation symmetry,
these models serve as solvable toy models where we may
disentangle the effects of intrinsic heterogeneity between
choices, and the effects of social interactions. Given that
experiments [17] suggest the latter is relevant in real
world decision making, this is a natural question to study.
We emphasize the importance of SSB for non-specialists
in Appendix F.
A. Stability of the Permutation Symmetric Fixed
Point
Directly analyzing the stability of the permutation
symmetric fixed point is straightforward, and so we be-
gin here. By permutation symmetry, αij must be of the
form
αij = a+ bδij (61)
for constants a and b. Using Eq. (41) we find that
an+ b = 0. (62)
We also know that the dynamics is constrained to the
simplex, which means that we only need consider eigen-
vectors δ~q for which δq1 + · · ·+ δqn = 0. Since the n− 1
eigenvectors which satisfy this constraint have eigenvalue
b, we conclude that the stability of the fixed point is con-
trolled entirely by this one eigenvalue. We can compute
b by computing a diagonal element of α:
α11 = a+ b =
n− 1
n
b. (63)
8 [17] referred to this phenomenon as “unpredictability”. Although
the state which the system spontaneously picks cannot be pre-
dicted, “physical properties” of the resulting state can be. As
an analogy, the Ising model on the square lattice undergoes a
phase transition at low temperatures: the magnetization is spon-
taneously either up or down. Nonetheless, the physical proper-
ties of the magnet are identical for each phase. Decision making
where the phase diagram is unpredictable is described in [12].
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If b < 1, the permutation symmetric point is stable; if
b > 1, it is unstable, and if b = 1, higher order corrections
are required.
One of the most important questions to ask is what ef-
fect the addition of more choices has on stability: do more
choices make the permutation symmetric point more or
less stable? It turns out that the answer depends on the
specific choice of F (u), and on any possible scaling limits
of F (u) as n gets large. We briefly discuss this question,
as well as aspects of the large n limit in Appendix G.
Whether or not a utility based model of decision mak-
ing has any real-world relevance in the large n limit is a
question to take seriously, however.
B. Landau Theory
Given an understanding of the stability of a permuta-
tion symmetric point, let us now return to a statement
we claimed earlier – it is non-generic for a permutation
symmetry breaking phase transition to be continuous.
We now sketch out why this is so, leaving details to Ap-
pendix H.
Near a permutation symmetric point, if we had a con-
tinuous phase transition, then we can expand out the
energy E as a Taylor series in δqi = qi − 1/n:
E ≈ −ζ
n∑
i=1
δq2i − ξ
n∑
i=1
δq3i + ω
n∑
i=1
δq4i + ψ
(
n∑
i=1
δq2i
)2
+ µ
n∑
i=1
δqi (64)
As we explain in the appendix, this is the most general
form of E(δ~q) consistent with permutation symmetry.
The final µ term serves as a Lagrange multiplier, en-
forcing that we are on the simplex. When ζ < 0, the
permutation symmetric phase is stable; when ζ > 0,
it is unstable. For the ~f = ~q model, we prove ξ > 0
in Appendix H. A thorough analysis there reveals that
for |ξ| > 0, and ζ → 0, the minima of E occur when
δq1 = · · · δqp 6= δqp+1 = · · · = δqn (up to the action of
Sn), and that δq1 is finite even as ζ → 0. This demon-
strates that within Landau theory, the phase transition
is discontinuous so long as ξ 6= 0 (setting ξ = 0 requires
fine tuning one parameter). This result is not partic-
ularly strange; it is well known that the ferromagnetic
(non-random field) Potts model [30, 31] has a discontin-
uous phase transition for n > 2 at mean field level; here
we see it holds at zero temperature with random fields,
and with a very general class of interactions. Thus, we
see from simple symmetry-based arguments that nearly
every symmetry-breaking phase transition in the n > 2
models should be discontinuous. This has important con-
sequences for economics – for example, without a large
amount of heterogeneity in intrinsic utilities (relative to
social utilties), nearly every phase transition will be dis-
continuous, suggesting the prevalence of market crashes.
C. Unimodal Distributions
It is of interest to us to analyze the symmetry of
the global minima of E when the permutation symmet-
ric fixed point is unstable. Consider the simple case
where F (u) describes a “unimodal” distribution which
is (roughly speaking) clustered around a single point.
Prototypical examples are the uniform distribution Eq.
(G6), the logistic distribution Eq. (A2), or a Gaussian
distribution F (u) = (1 + erf(u/σ))/2.
We have already described in detail the energy land-
scape of the logistic ternary decision model in a previous
section. In this model, we found that the permutation
symmetry group was broken from S3 to S2 – i.e., we
picked a preferred choice (e.g. q∗1 > q
∗
2 = q
∗
3).
It is qualitatively easy to understand why this should
be the case with the following simple argument: suppose
that there is no heterogeneity in the quenched disorder
(intrinsic utility):
F (u) = Θ(u) =
{
1 u ≥ 0
0 u < 0
. (65)
This corresponds to the limit β → ∞, in our logistic
model. Then, using δqi ≡ qi − 1/n, let us evaluate the
energy E constrained to the space
n∑
i=1
δq2i = constant. (66)
Remember that the constraint δq1 + · · · + δqn = 0 still
applies. The quadratic term in E is clearly a constant
on the sphere, and so the only quantity of interest is G,
which can be easily evaluated:
G(δq1, . . . , δqn) = −max(δq1, . . . , δqn). (67)
We see therefore that for any fixed distance from the per-
mutation symmetric fixed point, the minima of G (and
thus of E) are at points where (without loss of generality)
1 = −(n− 1)i, (i = 2, . . . , n). (68)
This corresponds to spontaneous symmetry breaking to
the subgroup Sn−1 ⊂ Sn, where exactly one choice be-
comes preferential over the others. In this deterministic
model, one can in fact check that the minima of E occur
precisely when q1 = 1.
The role of disorder in F (u) is to push (in many cases)
q1 to a slightly smaller value. Of course, in some cases,
we have seen that disorder is strong enough that q1 is
pushed all the way to the permutation symmetric point:
q1 = 1/n. However, if all choices are drawn from uni-
modal distributions, then our numerical analyses suggest
though no further symmetry breakings are possible – only
one choice becomes more favored over the others. For a
rigorous analysis in the large β limit of logistic models,
see Appendix I.
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D. Bimodal Distributions
A more interesting case to consider is a bimodal distri-
bution, where there are two sharp peaks in F (u). Curious
phase diagrams are known to arise in “O(n)” spin models
(which do not have discrete choices) subject to bimodal
random fields in certain directions [32]. We will see that
rich behavior can arise here as well.
The simplest example of this is to take
F (u) = pΘ(u) + (1− p)Θ(u− u0). (69)
We can think about this intuitively as follows: for each
choice, one dislikes it with probability p, and likes it with
probability 1− p.
Without loss of generality we set q1 > q2 > · · · ≥ qn.
Then we can compute G very straightforwardly:
G =
R∫
−R
du
∏
F (u− qi) =
R∫
q1
du
∏
F (u− qi). (70)
The coefficient R here is a regulator, and will not affect
the answer. Let us suppose that qm+1 = 0, but q1 > q2 >
· · · > qm > 0. Note that this requires u0 < q1 ≤ 1. Then
the integral is easy to compute:
G = pm (qm + u0 − q1) + pm−1 (qm−1 − qm) + · · ·+ p (q1 − q2) +R− q1. (71)
From this equation and Eq. (8) we can straightforwardly
deduce that:
q1 = 1− p+ pm, (72a)
qi = p
i−1(1− p) for 1 < i ≤ m. (72b)
Note for this solution to be allowed we require that qm+
u0 ≥ q1 or
pm ≥ u0 − 1 + p ≥ 2pm − pm−1 (73)
There is a very simple way of understanding Eq. (72).
If we like the most popular choice (probability 1 − p),
we will certainly go with that; if we don’t, we ask if we
prefer the next one (probability p(1 − p)), etc. Finally,
if we dislike all of the m choices which are represented
at mean field level, we simply go with the most popular
choice, as we dislike them all.
Let us suppose that this condition is obeyed. Then,
using that, within a local patch, anywhere on the simplex,
the energy function E is a quadratic polynomial of the
qis, the value of the total energy E on a solution with
symmetry breaking as above is
Em = p
mu0 − 1
2
[
(1− p+ pm)2 + (1− p)2
m−1∑
k=1
p2k
]
= pmu0 − 1
2
[
(1− p+ pm)2 + p
2
(
1− p2m−2) (1− p)
1 + p
]
. (74)
We then note that
Em−1 − Em = (u0 − 1 + p)pm−1(1− p)− p2m−1(1− p) = pm−1(1− p)(u0 − q1,m) < 0. (75)
We conclude that Em−1 > Em, and thus higher levels
of spontaneous symmetry breaking is always “more sta-
ble”. We have to be slightly careful about discussing
global stability based solely on energetic considerations,
as generically in a social model there is no reason that
dynamics have to favor lower energy minima over others
[12], but this is certainly suggestive that strongly per-
mutation symmetry broken states are the endpoint of
dynamics. A more thorough analysis would compute the
αij matrix at each permutation symmetry broken point,
but this is cumbersome and we will not do it here.
Finally, we note that Eq. (73) requires increasingly
fine-tuned u0 and p to break to smaller subgroups of Sn.
However, the formation of a hierarchy with Sn broken at
least twice does not require particularly strong tuning.
One can also smooth out the bimodal distribution, e.g.
by replacing step functions with logistic functions:
F (u) =
p
1 + e−β(u−u0)
+
1− p
1 + e−βu
. (76)
Repeated SSB and the formation of hierarchies is still
possible, as we show in Figure 6. In fact, by increasing
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FIG. 6: (Color online.) An example of SSB and hierarchy formation using F (u) given by Eq. (76), with p = 0.5, u0 = 0.73,
and (a) β = 3 and S3 symmetry at the global minimum, (b) β = 8, and S2 symmetry at the global minima (c) β = 50 with
no symmetry at the global minima. Decreasing heterogeneity leads to further breaking of permutation symmetry. We show
contour plots of E(x, y), with (x, y) a barycentric representation of the simplex; darker shades correspond to smaller values of
E, and lighter shades to larger values of E.
the parameter β, we find a series of transitions at which
the permutation symmetry breaks further and further (at
the global minimum of E). We expect that a similar phe-
nomenon of repeated symmetry breaking as β increases
will happen for n > 3.
E. An Opt-Out Option
In this section, we will suggest a way of using our deci-
sion model to model the behavior of markets where a ’no
buy’ option is allowed. Since we still have a Sn−1 sym-
metry, we can do this by letting choices 1, . . . , n− 1 refer
to undifferentiated sellers which an individual is buying
a product from. Alternatively, these choices could be
n− 1 identical (on average) products, but which are dis-
tinguishable to individual consumers. we will let the final
’choice’ n correspond to the possibility that a buyer has
opted out.
We assume that the “no buy” choice has a fixed utility:
Fn(u) = Θ(u) (77)
and
fn = 0. (78)
For notational ease, let m = n − 1. Note that we have
used our freedom to shift the overall additive constant in
social utility fi to set the utility of not buying to be 0.
Of course, we will want to include some aspect of “pric-
ing” in our model. We will achieve this by heuristically
defining ~f as follows (for the remainder of this section,
the vector index will only be over indices 1 to m− 1):
~f = ~q − ~p, (79)
where ~p is a “price” vector. Formally at this point it
only corresponds to some external “driving” of the sys-
tem, which we will associate with changes in the prices
of various sellers.
The energy to be minimized is
E =
1
2
m∑
i=1
q2i +G(~q − ~p) (80)
where the form of the G function is
G =
∫
duΘ(u)
m∏
i=1
F (u− qi + pi)
=
∞∫
0
du
m∏
i=1
F (u− qi + pi) (81)
where again, a simple regularization of G is required.
Note that G is independent of qn. We will define αij
similarly as before, but we will usually neglect αin (this
drops the constraint Eq. (41), when the sum is restricted
to i = 1, . . . ,m).
As a simple example, we look at permutation symmet-
ric fixed points with Sm symmetry, so that all qi = q and
all pi = p for i = 1, . . . ,m. This corresponds to solutions
which satisfy
q =
∞∫
0
du
1
m
d
du
[F (u− q + p)]m = 1− F (p− q)
m
m
. (82)
Symmetry strongly constrains the form of α at such a
fixed point: just as before, we have αij = a+bδij , but now
neglecting the n index there is no constraint relating a to
b. There are two eigenvalues of this matrix on the simplex
now: the eigenvalue a corresponds to the scenario where
buyers simply shuffle between choices, but none enter or
leave the market, and corresponds to perturbations with
1 + · · · + m = 0. The eigenvalue b + na corresponds
to retaining permutation symmetry (1 = · · · = m) but
having agents leave or enter the marketplace. Since
a = −
∞∫
0
duF ′(u− q + p)2F (u− q + p)m−2 < 0 (83)
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we conclude that spontaneous symmetry breaking is al-
ways the dominant instability of a permutation symmet-
ric fixed point.
If we use the logistic distribution for F (u), equilibria
are found by solving
q =
1
m
[
1− 1(
1 + e−β(p−q)
)m
]
. (84)
Bistability is only possible if the q-derivative on the right
hand side takes values larger than 1, which occurs if there
is a q such that
1 < F ′(p− q)F (p− q)m−1. (85)
We show an explicit example with m = 2 and SSB in
Figure 7.
Let us briefly discuss an empirical application of the
above observation. Suppose one has a market with dis-
tinct products (or sellers), but with strong regulation, so
that the price of the market is fixed. This model predicts
that if the permutation symmetric point ever becomes
unstable, as the regulator lowers the price in the market,
interactions will drive the system to a symmetry broken
point. Although in principle this should be readily ob-
servable, in practice the permutation symmetric assump-
tion is likely too strong. It may be the case, however,
that this heuristic observation of regulated markets be-
ing more unstable to herding than symmetry-preserving
crashes, may be observable given aggregated economic
data.
VII. COMPLEXITY ON GRAPHS
In this section, we discuss the emergence of complexity
– an exponential number of solutions to the equations of
state – when this decision model describes agents inter-
acting via a graph. Statistical physics on random graphs
has played an important role in the development of in-
terdisciplinary physics, due to (reasonable) hope that the
physics of models on random graphs captures key insight
into the behavior of realistic social systems on realistic
social networks [33, 34]. [11, 12] discussed aspects of
complexity for binary decision models on graphs, so we
conclude with a brief, analogous discussion for n > 2.
It is straightforward to extend our model to allow for
decision making on graphs. Let us consider a graph G =
(V,E), with V the vertex set (we label vertices u, v, . . .)
and E the edge set, consisting of undirected, unweighted
edges between two nodes. The edge between nodes u
and v is denoted with (uv). The degree of node v, or
the number of edges connecting to node v, is a positive
integer kv; we denote with 〈k〉 the average number of
edges per node. As usual, we will consider a “random
graph” limit where the number of nodes tends to∞, but
the degree distribution (and thus 〈k〉) is fixed, and we
assume that there are no correlations in the likelihoods
of edges between nodes of different degree. Denote with
N the total number of nodes.
The only change required to our model is as follows:
for each node v, we define ~qv to be the probability that
a neighbor of node v is in a given state:
qv,i ≡ P (xu,i = 1 | (uv) ∈ E) . (86)
We then replace Eq. (1) with
Vv,i = Uv,i + fi(~qv). (87)
The mean-field limit of these equations reduces to the
formalism described above, and corresponds to the limit
where kv → ∞. We assume that we are expanding
around a stable fixed point of the MF equations. For
the remainder of ths section, we will work in the limit
where n/kv is small. This allows us to reliably do per-
turbation theory around a MF state, where node v sees
≈ kvqi & 1 of its neighbors in state i.9
It is simplest to understand the emergence of complex-
ity with a simple “thought experiment” [11]. Let us ask
for the probability that there is a pair of nodes u and v,
which are connected, and for which there are two solu-
tions to the equations of state: one where u and v are
both in state i (and w 6= u, v are in some irrelevant states
xw), and one where u and v are both in state j, but for
w 6= u, v, the states are unchanged: see Figure 8. Using
Eq. (48), so long as ku,v  1, we find that the probabil-
ity for this occuring is 4|αij |2/kukv. When n = 2, that is
the end of the story, but for n > 2 it is a bit more subtle.
There is also a possibility that node u or v starts in state
k intsead of i, or that node u or v starts in state i but
ends in state l. Accounting for these two possibilities as
well, one finds the total probability that there are two
solutions to the equations of state where nodes u and v
take on different values in each solution, but all other
nodes take on the same values in both solutions, is10
P(uv) =
4|αij |2
kukv
+
∑
l 6=i,j
2|αij |(|αlj |+ |αil|)
kukv
=
2|αij |(|αii|+ |αjj |)
kukv
(88)
Next, let us pick a node v, chosen uniformly at random
in the graph. What is the probability that there exists
one solution to the equations of state where zv,i = 1, and
another solution where zv,j = 1? The answer is given by
P(i, j) =
2|αij |(αii + αjj)
〈k〉 . (89)
9 If this number can be small compared to 1, then random fluctu-
ations in the states of neighbors become important – see [11].
10 The second line follows from the first, using the identities that
the sum of the entries of any row of αij vanishes.
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FIG. 7: (Color online.) An example of “opt out” multiple choice decision making with m = 2 choices of sellers/products. Note
that the upper right corner has q1 + q2 > 1, which is forbidden by the simplex constraint. We used a logistic distribution for F
with β = 4. Displayed are contour plots of E(q1, q2) with prices p1 = p2 = p (defined in Eq. 79) for (a) p = 0.4, (b) p = 0.44,
(c) p = 0.5; darker shades correspond to smaller values of E, and lighter shades to larger values of E. As p increases, we can
see the phase transition from a SSB phase to a permutation symmetric phase. This can be understood heuristically: at large
p, only the agents with strong preferences for products are in the market, and there are not enough remaining agents to have
comparably large social utilities.
u vu v
FIG. 8: (Color online.) A connected pair of nodes u and
v, for which there is one solution to the equations of state
where they are both in state i, and a second solution where
they are both in state j. Colored circles denote nodes in the
graph; different colors are different states. All other nodes
have identical states in each of these two solutions. In the
thermodynamic limit, the presence of these clusters leads to
an exponential number of solutions to the equations.
In the macroscopic limit such a change in ~q is not not-
icable for a single pair of nodes, but because there is a
finite probability for any given pair of nodes that mul-
tiple solutions exist, there are an exponential number of
possible solutions to the equations of state, and there is
a macroscopic spectrum of allowed values for ~q.
Note that when 〈k〉 → ∞, the complexity phenomenon
is not present. This has to happen, because there is no
complexity on a complete graph.
There is a simple mathematical framework called the
Thouless-Anderson-Palmer (TAP) equation [35, 36] (re-
lated to a mathematical technique called belief propa-
gation [37]) which allows us to make the simple calcu-
lation above more formal and to include the possibility
of clusters with more than 2 nodes. In particular, we
can consider the possibility of clusters of arbitrary size.
These equations can, in principle, be exactly treated non-
perturbatively when the graph is approximated to be a
tree, as was done in the simple case n = 2 earlier [11].
Exact solvability is related to a nested structure of prob-
ability measures, which in turn follows from the fact that
there is a unique path between any two nodes on a tree.
Our strategy for computing the generalization of Eq.
(89), accounting for the possibility of arbitrary sized clus-
ters on a locally tree-like graph, is as follows. Let us de-
fine with ξij the probability, accounting for the possible
behavior of other nodes, that a given node v’s neighbors
will flip from i to j, given that either one of its neighbors
flipped from i to any other state, or from any other state
to j. (In particular, ξij 6= αij , because it may be possible
that a node will only flip when two of its neighbors have
flipped.) Then, by definition:
P(i, j) =
2|αij |
〈k〉 〈δqv,j − δqv,i〉
=
2|αij |
〈k〉
∑
l 6=i
ξli +
∑
l 6=j
ξlj
 . (90)
This is our effective belief propagation equation or TAP
equation. The factor of 2 in front accounts for the fact
that we can either start from i and end in state j, or
vice versa, just as before. |αij |/〈k〉 is the coefficient of
proportionality in the probability that node v would flip
from i to j, given the value of δqv,j − δqv,i, calculated
under the assumption that node v flipped from i to j.
By definition of ξlm, the expectation value of δqv,j−δqv,i
can be easily written down.
So we have to simply find an expression for ξij .
11 To
11 We cannot directly use Eq. (56), because we must be careful to
count the number of nodes correctly. The subtlety is as follows:
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do this, we use the following recursive equation:
ξij = |αij |
1 +∑
l 6=i
ξli +
∑
l 6=j
ξlj
 , (91)
The factor of |αij | comes as usual from Eq. (48) – the
factors of 1 +
∑
ξ come from both the neighbor we engi-
neered to flip, and then the response of all other neigh-
bors.12 It is now straightforward to solve for ξij . Denote
the matrix
Mij,kl =
 (|α|ij)
−1 − 2 ij = kl
−1 ij, kl have 1 letter in common
0 otherwise
(92)
where we consider ij, ji to be the same index. Then it is
easy to see that we simply have to solve the linear algebra
problem ∑
kl
Mij,klξkl = 1 (93)
to determine ξij , and thus determine P(i, j). It is not
guaranteed that this equation has a physical solution –
this absence may correspond, e.g., to the fact that the
original fixed point was not stable (and thus clusters
trivially percolate through a finite fraction of the entire
graph). In general the resulting expression will be quite
complicated; in the limit where |αij |  1/n, we can ap-
proximate that ξij ≈ |αij |, and P(i, j) is simply given by
Eq. (89).
It is particularly simple to solve Eq. (93) in the binary
(n = 2) case – see Appendix E.
VIII. FINITE SIZE EFFECTS
Let us briefly discuss the consequences of finite size
effects – namely, if we only have a finite number of N
agents, to what extent is the phenomenology discussed
above altered? This is important: any real experiment
has finite N . A more detailed analysis of finite-size ef-
fects in the n = 2 case is present in [11] – here we briefly
discuss the extension to n > 2. We now return to the
assumption that the graph is fully connected for all re-
maining computations in this paper.
Finite size effects come from fluctuations in the realiza-
tion of the probability distribution P(V1 > u1, . . . , Vn >
in the computation of Zit before, we noted that it was twice as
likely as |αij | for a node to flip aligned with its neighbor i→ j.
12 Recall the following minor subtlety – this equation relies on the
factorization of the probability measure. This does not happen
if there are any cycles in the graph, because two neighbors of a
node v may feel each other’s influence even if v does not change.
The assumption that our graph is locally tree-like allows for fac-
torization of the measure, and thus makes this equation exact.
un). These lead to fluctuations in effective free energy
G: i.e. G → G + ∆G, with ∆G the small fluctuations
dependent on the realization of disorder. These fluctua-
tions then induce fluctuations in ~q∗: ~q∗ → ~q∗ + ∆~q, with
~q∗ the mean-field result. We have:
~q∗ + ∆~q = − ∂(G+ ∆G)
∂~q
∣∣∣∣
~q=~q∗+∆~q
. (94)
At leading (first) order in fluctuations we find
∆qi = (1− α)−1ij
(
−∂∆G
∂qj
)
~q=~q∗
. (95)
Recall that the function G is chosen so that by construc-
tion, −∂G/∂qi is equal to the probability that any agent
prefers choice i, given the choices ~q of all others. Since
the intrinsic utilities Vi,α are i.i.d. random variables, we
find (
−∂∆G
∂qi
)
~q=~q∗
=
1
N
∑
α
xi,α − q∗i . (96)
with xi,α i.i.d. (in α) random variables, such that
P(xi,α = 1) = q
∗
i . This fixes the probability distribu-
tion of ∆qi. From it, we see that finite size effects are
suppressed by a 1N factor. For instance, the covariance
matrix is
Cov(∆qi,∆qj) =
1
N
(1− α)−1ik (1− α)−1jl Ckl, (97)
where
Ckl = q∗kδkl − q∗kq∗l . (98)
So long as N & 100, it is therefore unlikely that this type
of finite size effect alters our results in any appreciable
way, unless we are close to a phase transition (where an
eigenvalue of α tends to 1).
In addition to finite size effects, there are also finite
network effects (which persist even when N → ∞) –
these are consequences of finite 〈k〉. In particular, not
every node sees enough neighbors to effectively be de-
scribed by mean field effects. The most important change
this induces is that the fraction of nodes in state i that
a node with k edges sees – denoted with qi,k – fluctuates
from node to node. In the n = 2 case, these fluctuations
smooth out the energy landscape and suppress discon-
tinuous phase transitions [11]. We expect this smoothing
phenomenon to carry over to the n > 2 case.
IX. OSCILLATIONS IN COLLECTIVE
TERNARY DECISION MAKING
So far in this paper, we have only discussed the case
where the decision model settles to a stable fixed point.
This assumes that Eq. (8) has a stable solution. How-
ever, there are functions ~f(~q) for which there are no sta-
ble fixed points! Thus, it may be the case (as can hap-
pen in evolutionary game theory [38]) that our model
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describes persistent dynamics. In these cases, we con-
clude that an energy E cannot be (globally) well-defined,
as otherwise the dynamical evolution of the system Eq.
(42) (~˙q = −∇fG− ~q) necessarily tends towards a (local)
minimum of E. As first order dynamics on the real line
must always tend to a fixed point, we study a model with
n = 3, the first case where persistent dynamics can arise.
A simple example of this is as follows. Let us consider
the logistic distribution Fi(u) = [1 + e
−βu]−1. We then
choose
f1 = cq2 − q3, (99a)
f2 = cq3 − q1, (99b)
f3 = cq1 − q2. (99c)
with c > 0.13 Numerically, we find that the only fixed
point of Eq. (42) (where q˙i = 0) is qi = 1/3 for all i. We
determine the stability of this fixed point by standard
methods [39], and find that it is unstable so long as
β(1− c) > 8. (100)
As the dynamics is constrained to the simplex, we con-
clude by the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem that the dy-
namics tends to a limit cycle if Eq. (100) is satisfied [39].
Note that c < 1 is required for a limit cycle to exist –
this is consistent with similar results from [38].
X. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have argued that the random field
Potts model (and a wide variety of generalizations) are
reasonable models for collective decision making with
interacting, heterogeneous agents. Unlike in previous
works, our mean field analysis has allowed for a thorough
analytic discussion of the phase diagram of the model un-
der a variety of types of heterogeneity. We have argued
that with multiple choices, the presence of discontinu-
ous phase transitions – analogous to jumps and market
crashes – is an incredibly generic phenomenon.
Let us briefly discuss extensions of this work. One in-
teresting thing to do would be to consider the model on
a graph where n & 〈k〉. In this case, we expect more
interesting phases to emerge, where the clusters of nodes
α whose states i are undetermined percolate through the
entire graph. This should correspond with interesting
dynamical phenomena and a possible emergence of glass-
like physics. The antiferromagnetic Potts model (with-
out random fields) is equivalent to the NP-hard graph
coloring problem; the rich phase diagram of this model
[40] may have interesting implications for antagonistic
social decision making. It will also be interesting to con-
sider adding “supply-side” behavior to this model, as in
13 Note that det(∂fi/∂qj) = 0 at all points for this model, and we
can no longer define any potential E(~q), even locally.
[10], which leads to the study of a “competitive” mar-
ket with interacting agents. In particular, crucial ques-
tions to ask become whether profit-maximizing suppliers
can stabilize markets against phase transitions/market
crashes, the consequences of interactions on oligopolies,
etc. Finally, to the extent to which it is reasonable to
consider social networks as approximately living in a two
dimensional space [41–43], a natural extension of our en-
ergy function – valid over length scales much larger than
the “lattice spacing” of the graph – to
E =
∫
d2x
[
E(~q(x)) +
Dij
2
∇qi(x) · ∇qj(x)
]
(101)
would allow us to study the relaxational dynamics of spa-
tial patterns using an Allen-Cahn equation [28]. In a SSB
phase, an initial condition where different regions of space
are in different minima of the energy will relax very slowly
to the global minimum (where ~q(x) is x-independent) due
to the slow dynamics of boundaries between different re-
gions [44–46]; see [13] for similar ideas.
We are reaching an era where direct experiments
[17, 47–49] may be used to probe social behavior, or exist-
ing data can be analyzed from the framework of testing
statistical mechanics models [41–43, 50–53]. It is thus
important to understand what are reasonable empirical
tests for these models. Signatures of the collective de-
cision making in this paper certainly include discontin-
uous jumps and phase transitions and “glassy” physics
associated with a large number of equilibria. These are
both phenomena beyond the classical paradigm of eco-
nomics – an observation of the latter in particular would
be strongly suggestive that this type of model is captur-
ing qualitative behaviors of social systems. Extending
the analysis of avalanches in this paper, and comparing
the statistics of avalanches on random graphs with the
distribution of avalanche sizes in empirical data may also
be a fruitful direction.14 However, these phenomena are
generic to disordered spin models and thus may not be
helpful for ruling out any over any others. Two phenom-
ena which may be more specific to this model are the
relationship between spontaneous “hierarchy” formation
and bimodal “utility” distributions, and the fact that
markets always spontaneously break permutation sym-
metry instead of jumping between two permutation sym-
metric points. We hope that some of these phenomena
may be experimentally confirmed in the near future.
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Appendix A: Results for the Logistic Distribution
As introduced in Sect. IV A 2, there exists an ansatz
for single-peaked intrinsic utility functions such thatG(~q)
and hence E(~q) have an analytic closed form.
Suppose the peak for choice i is centered around Ui =
ai, and that each peak has a spread (variance) of σ
2 that
is the same for all choices. A convenient distribution is
F ′i (u) =
β
4
sech2
β(u− ai)
2
(A1)
where σ2 = pi2/3β2, with the CDF Fi(u) taking the sim-
ple logistic (or Fermi-Dirac) form
Fi(u) =
1
1 + e−β(u−ai)
, (A2)
G is obtained by substituting Eq. (A2) into Eq. (7):
G = lim
R→∞
R∫
−∞
du
∏
j
1
1 + eβ(fi+ai−u)
= lim
R→∞
1
β
∞∫
e−βR
dz
z
∏
j
1
1 + αjz
= R− 1
β
n∑
i=1
αn−1i logαi
n∏
j 6=i
1
αi − αj
→ − 1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
∂
∂β
(
αn−1i
) n∏
j 6=i
1
αi − αj (A3)
where αi = e
β(fi+ai). One can interpret eβai as some kind
of market ”fugacity” where the offset ai takes the role of
the chemical potential of choice i. In the last line, we
have dropped an irrelevant additive constant R resulting
from the regularization of the divergent integral. Care
has to be taken in handling the upper limit R, since the
integral diverges linearly with R. The third line can be
obtained from the second line by contour integration or
partial fraction expansion.
Eq. (A3) is somewhat opaque – in particular, it looks
highly singular as αi → αj . In fact, this expression is
perfectly regular as αi → αj (as it has to be – from the
integral definition of G, there is certainly no singular be-
havior as qi → qj). To see this, let us suppose that, with-
out loss of generality, q1, . . . , ql are all approaching some
universal value q∗, and all other qs are distinct. Equiva-
lently, α1, . . . , αl → α∗. Then the singular contributions
to G associated with these coincident αs appear to be
the first l terms, which we may approximate at leading
order in this limit as
Gl ≈ − logα∗
β
∏
j>l
1
α∗ − αj
l∑
j=1
αn−1j
∏
i 6=j
1
αj − αi . (A4)
Focusing for simplicity only on the final term (the sum
from j = 1, . . . , l), we may re-write it as
l∑
j=1
αn−1j
∏
i6=j
1
αj − αi =
l∑
j=1
(−1)j−1αn−1j
∏
j 6=i<k
(αi − αk)∏
i<j≤l
(αi − αj)
. (A5)
It will suffice to focus on the numerator of the above expression, and show that it is proportional to α1 − α2 –
by permutation symmetry, it is therefore linear in all pairs αi − αj , and thus regular. The terms in the sum from
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j = 3, . . . , l are manifestly linear in α1 − α2, so let us look at the first two terms:
2∑
j=1
(−1)j−1αn−1j
∏
j 6=i<k
(αi − αk) =
∏
i,j>2
(αi − αj)
αn−11 ∏
j>2
(α2 − αj)− αn−12
∏
j>2
(α1 − αj)

=
∏
i,j>2
(αi − αj)
∑
sets of m
∏
(−αm)
[
αn−11 α
n−2−nm
2 − αn−12 αn−2−nm1
]
=
∏
i,j>2
(αi − αj)
∑
sets of m
∏
(−αm)
nm∑
j=0
αnm−j1 α
j
2
 (α1 − α2)(α1α2)n−2−nm (A6)
where in the above equations, nm is the number of ms in the product of −am. We see that the first two terms are
also linear in α1 − α2, thus verifying that G is regular.
In the large β limit, there is no market heterogeneity
and G reduces to the very simple expression
lim
β→∞
= −max(f1 + a1, ..., fn + an) (A7)
A finite β hence simply corresponds to a smoothening of
G in Eq. (A7), despite the seemingly complicated Eq.
(A3).
An analytic solution will still exist even if β = βi are
not the same for all Fi. That, however, calls for more
than simple partial fraction expansions and the resultant
expression looks less elegant.
The MF equilibrium values for qk’s are given by
qk = − ∂G
∂fk
= − ∂
∂fk
−1
β
n∑
i=1
αn−1i logαi
n∏
j 6=i
1
αi − αj

= αk
∂
∂αk
 n∑
i=1
αn−1i logαi
n∏
j 6=i
1
αi − αj
 (A8)
We can explicitly check that conservation of probability
holds:
n∑
k
qk = ~α · ∂G(~α)
∂~α
=
∂G(t~α)
∂t
|t=1
=
∂
∂t
G(~α) + log t n∑
i
n∏
j 6=i
αn−1i
αi − αj

t=1
=
N∑
i
n∏
j 6=i
αn−1i
αi − αj
= 1 (A9)
This proof is reminiscent of Euler’s theorem on homoge-
neous functions. Indeed, our function G can be thought
of as a “partially” homogeneous function, with a part ho-
mogeneous with degree zero and a nonhomogenous loga-
rithmic contribution.
From Eq. (A9), we also see that
G(f1 + a, f2 + a, ...) = G(f1, f2, ...) + a (A10)
so that an overall shift in the utility functions has no
physical effect. Also, scalar rescalings of the social util-
ity ~f → A~f can be absorbed in the inverse temperature
β. To see how, denote Gβ and Eβ as the potentials cor-
responding to inverse temperature β. Then
Gβ(A~f) = AGβA(~f) (A11)
and, if ~f = −∇qH (this implies that H → AH under a
rescaling):
Eβ(A~f) = Gβ(A~f) +
(
H− ~q · ∂H
∂~q
)
= Gβ(A~f) +A
(
HA=1 − ~q · ∂HA=1
∂~q
)
= AEβA(~f) (A12)
Note that Eq. (A12) holds only if β is the same for all
choices.
Appendix B: A detailed study of the binary (n = 2)
case
We explore the model introduced in Sect. IV A 2.
With the effective intrinisic utilities given by Fi(u) =
1
1+e−β(u−ai) , Eq. A3 with n = 2 reduces to
G = −f1e
βf1 − f2eβf2
eβf1 − eβf2
= −f2 + f1 − f2
eβ(f2−f1) − 1 (B1)
Plugging in the explicit expressions fi = aiqi + bi where
q1 = q and q2 = 1−q, we obtain f2−f1 = A−Bq, where
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A = b2 + a2 − a1 and B = b1 + b2. Hence
E(q)
= G(q) +H(q)−
∑
qi
qi
∂H(q)
∂qi
|q1+q2=1
= G(q) +
b1q
2 + b2(1− q)2
2
= −a2 − b2(1− q) + Bq −A
eβ(A−Bq) − 1 +
b1q
2 + b2(1− q)2
2
=
Bq −A
eβ(A−Bq) − 1 +
b1 + b2
2
q2 + const.
= B
(
q2
2
+
q − C
eβ′(q−C) − 1
)
+ const. (B2)
where C = AB and β
′ = Bβ.
1. High and low β′ limit
In the large β′ limit,
lim
β′→∞
E(q) = (C − q)θ(q − C) + q
2
2
(B3)
which reduces to the homogeneous case result E(q) =
−max(q − U0, 1 − q) + (q2 + (1 − q)2)/2 upon the iden-
tification C = (1− U0)/2 and β → +∞.
In the opposite limit of small β′,
lim
β′→0
E(q) = B
q2
2
+
1
β
(
1− β
′
2
(q − C)
)
+ O(β′)
=
B
2
(
q − 1
2
)2
+ const. (B4)
which suggest that high levels of disorder or social forces,
the system assumes the maximal entropic state q1 = q2 =
1
2 , independently of any intrinsic utility.
2. Conditions for bistability
One can obtain necessary conditions for bistability, i.e.
having two minima by expanding the potential about
q = C to quadratic order: E ≈
(
1
2 − β
′
12
)(
q − 3−β′C6−β′
)2
+
const. Since we require an unstable equilibrium in the
middle, 12 − β
′
12 < 0 or β
′ = βB > 6. Also, the unstable
equilibrium must occur at 0 < q < 1, so β′C = βA > 3.
Both conditions require that β is sufficiently large, i.e.
that the agents are sufficiently homogeneous in their in-
trinsic utilities. This is a sensible precondition for any
sudden market transition (crash). Furthermore, βA must
also be large enough, or there will not be sufficient utility
differential between the choices to drive the crash. Ul-
timately, the social effect β′ = βB must also be large
enough to create two basins in the potential, so that a
bifurcation can occur. In fact, there must be two basins
of attraction in the limit of large positive social effect, as
evidenced from the discontinuity in the large β′ limit of
E: (C − q)Θ(q − C) + q2/2.
One can obtain the conditions for bistability to any de-
gree of accuracy through the graphical solution described
next.
3. Location of the fixed points
We now solve for the fixed points explicitly via qi =
−∂G/∂fi. From Eq. (B1),
G = − ∂
∂β
log(eβf1 − eβf2) (B5)
Switching orders of differentiation, it follows that that
q = q1 = Q(x) =
1
1− ex +
xex
(1− ex)2 (B6)
where x = β(f2 − f1). This equation can be solved self-
consistently. In particular, it depends only the difference
of the utilities of the two choices. This makes sense: with
the spreads in the intrinsic utilies being equal, there is
no ”intrinsic” reluctance to switch choices and the fixed
points thus depend only on the difference in the utilties.
Now let us solve for the specific model in Sect. IV A 2
explicitly. With f1 = a1 + b1q and f2 = a2 + b2(1− q),
x = β(f2 − f1) = β(A−Bq) (B7)
where A = b2 + a2 − a1 and B = b1 + b2. Hence the
the solution for the fixed points can be found from the
intersection of q = Q(x) and the linear graph q = (A −
x/β)/B.
a. Analysis and physical interpretation of the fixed points
Analysis of the possible behaviors is simple, because
only the straight line has parametric dependence. We
see that the x-intercept occurs at x = βA and the
slope is −1/Bβ. Only one solution is possible if βB =
β(b1 + b2) < 6, since that is the maximum downward
slope of Q(x). This is just saying that we need a mini-
mal amount of social interactions (q dependence) before
phase transitions are possible, no matter how skewed the
intrinsic utilities are.
If βB is very large, the line will intersect the curve very
far away. Hence the stable solutions of q1 will be either
near 1 or 0: very strong social interactions result in an
all-or-nothing scenario.
From the graph, we need βA = β(a2−a1) > 3 for 3 so-
lutions to be possible. Thus, a phase transition can only
happen if the intrinsic utility of choice 2 is sufficiently
larger than that of 1, no matter how big or small are
the social interactions. This should be true in all n = 2
models with linear utilities.
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FIG. 9: Plots of y = Q(x) (black) and y = B−1(A − x/β)
(blue). Here β = 10, A = 0.78 and B = 1.4. The y-axis is
magnified ten times for clarity. The left and right solutions
are stable, while the middle one is unstable.
Finally, if we start from a large x-intercept βA and
increase βB from a negative value, the straight line will
rotate about the intercept anticlockwise until it suddenly
has 2 new solutions with large q1 (though there will be
only 1 solution exactly at a critical point). This is just
saying that with sufficient initial intrinsic disutility of
choice 1, a phase transition must occur as social interac-
tions are introduced.
Appendix C: More General Gradient Flow
Gradient flow dynamics exist in the general case where
where ~f = −∇qH i.e. that the MF social utility is deriv-
able from a microscopic Hamiltonian, and ∂fi/∂qj is ei-
ther positive definite or negative definite. Intuitively, the
requirement for positive or negative definiteness avoids
degenerate points where ∂fi∂qj = 0, which generically im-
ply a noninjective utility function ~f(~q). An unique energy
surface can only be defined if there is a one to one cor-
respondence between configurations ~q and their utilities
~f .
For the gradient flow, we consider a change of variables
to ~γ(~q), with ∂γi/∂qj positive definite. Multiplying Eq.
(42) with ∂γk/∂qi,
− ∂γk
∂qi
(
∂G
∂fi
− qi
)
=
∂γk
∂qi
q˙i = γ˙k (C1)
If we choose
∂γk
∂qi
∂γk
∂qj
= ±∂fi
∂qj
(C2)
where the± sign is chosen if ∂fi/∂qj is positive (negative)
definite, some matrix manipulations similar to Eq. (15)
reveal that
γ˙k = ∓ ∂
∂γk
(G+H+ qifi)
= ∓ ∂E
∂γk
. (C3)
Therefore, we see that gradient flow dynamics is con-
sistent for rather general class of ~f(~q).
1. Linear Utilities
One example is the particularly simple case where
~f = A~q (C4)
with A a matrix. In the main text, we have focused on
the case where A is the identity matrix. Here, we allow
the social utility fi of choice i to depend on the qj for all
the various choices j. For instance, the social utility of a
certain social medium website may also depend positively
on the popularity of certain sister sites, and negatively
on that of rival sites. Since A must be positive definite,
A is symmetric. This means that the utility functions
are reciprocal : If fi depends on the proportion of agents
subscribed to choice j via fi = λqj+..., then fj = λqi+...
too.
Write
A = STDS (C5)
with D a diagonal matrix with positive eigenvalues, and
S an orthogonal matrix. We then define
~γ = D1/2S~q. (C6)
It is easy to check that this satisfies Eq. (C2). Since
H − ~qT · ∂H∂~q = 12~qTA~q, we obtain
E(~γ) =
1
2
|~γ|2 +G
(
~f
)
(C7)
where ~f = STD1/2~γ. We still retain the same quadratic
term as in the ~f = ~q case, but with a G that depends
on an argument rotated and rescaled by STD1/2. Note
that the configuration space simplex is also rotated and
rescaled, but in the opposite way D1/2S.
2. Nonlinear Noncooperative Utilities
Nonlinear utility functions allow for varying levels of
marginal utilities at different stages of market domina-
tion, and can thus represent real scenarios more realis-
tically. Consider the simplest case where each fi is an
arbitrary monotonic function of qi only, i.e. the utilities
of the different choices decouple. The matrix ∂fi/∂qj is
then diagonal and we can simply find γ:
γi =
∫ √
dfi
dqi
dqi. (C8)
a. Power-law utilities
As the simplest example, consider the case where
fi = giq
ηi
i . (C9)
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Then we find that
E =
∑
i
ηi + 1
4
γ2i +G
(
~f(~γ)
)
(C10)
where
γi =
2
√
ηigi
ηi + 1
q
(ηi+1)/2
i . (C11)
and
fi(γi) = gi
(
ηi + 1
2
√
ηigi
)2ηi/(ηi+1)
γ
2ηi/(ηi+1)
i . (C12)
b. Logarithmic utilities
Now consider the logarithmic utility function
fi = gi log(qi + δ) (C13)
with δ a small regularizing constant. Here, the marginal
utility approximately proportional to the fractional
change of the market share qi. From Eq. C8, we ob-
tain γi = 2
√
gi(qi + δ). This leads us to
E =
∑
i
γ2i
4
+ (giδ)
(
log
γ2i
4gI
− 1
)
+G
(
~f(~γ)
)
=
∑
i
giqi + giδ log(qi + δ) +G(~f)
≈
∑
i
giqi +G(~f) (C14)
which bears superficial similarity with the above power-
law case with ηi = 0. In the last line, we have dropped
the logarithmic term, which tends towards zero as δ → 0.
This energy potential is analyzed graphically in Fig. 2.
Notice that in all of the above cases, E always contain
quadratic contributions in γi.
Appendix D: More on Ternary Decision Making
1. The Permutation Symmetric Logistic Case
Here we provide additional details on logistic permuta-
tion symmetric ternary decision making. As in the main
text, we work in barycentric coordinates; we will also
complexify them as in Eq. (36), and set z¯ = x − iy. By
a brute-force expansion of Eq. (A3), the energy E is
E ≈
(
1
3
− β
12
)
|z|2 − β
2
180
|z|3 cos 3θ + β
3
720
|z|4
+6× 10−6β5|z|6 + · · · (D1)
which is very accurate for β & 1, away from the simplex
corners. Recall that
|z|2 = 3
2
3∑
i=1
(
qi − 1
3
)2
(D2)
denotes the distance from the permutation symmetric
fixed point.
We see that the permutation-symmetric point is stable
for β < 4, unstable for β > 4 and marginally unstable
(a monkey saddle) for β = 4. This makes physical sense:
For small β social interactions are suppressed by market
heterogeneity and SSB should not occur. For large β,
social interactions distort individual preferences, and we
will expect that once one of three roughly equally intrin-
sically desirable products have some lead, it will continue
to dominate.
2. Conformal Symmetry
Since the n = 3 simplex is planar, it possesses a con-
formal group (transformations which distort space but
locally preserve angles) with an infinite number of gen-
erators. This fact can be exploited to easily write down
the path swept out by ~q(t) near the critical point when
~f = ~q. On the simplex, a straightforward calculation
shows that
x˙ = −3
2
∂E
∂x
, y˙ = −3
2
∂E
∂y
. (D3)
Near a phase transition, we find from Eq. (45) that the
charge density ρ = 4∂z∂z¯E ≈ 0. Hence we can approxi-
mate E as the real part of a holomorphic function w(z):
E = Re(w(z)). From the Cauchy-Riemann equations, we
obtain that the trajectory of ~q(t) to be along level curves
of Im(w), i.e. normal to the level curves of E = Re(w).
As an example, take the abovementioned permutation
symmetric model at β = 4. The trajectories are given by
constant = − β
′2
360
Im
(
z3
)
=
β2
180
(y3 − 3xy)
=
√
3β2
480
(q1 − q2)((q1 − q2)2 − 6q3 + 2) (D4)
This follows from the term in E containing z3 + z¯3 ∝
Re(z3). This E corresponds to an electrostatic potential
which can be realized between a 60◦ wedge whose outer
edges are conductors held at different potentials.
Appendix E: Avalanches and Complexity with n = 2
In a previous paper [11] we used a similar formalism
to derive many results for n = 2 in a simpler way. For
pedagogy, we will explain how to use the formalism of this
paper to derive our old results concerning avalanches and
the complexity phenomenon, which are the trickiest to re-
derive. The key point to note is that αij is a symmetric
2× 2 matrix which has two constraints that the sums on
rows/columns vanishes. There is a unique way to write
this matrix:
α =
(
α0/2 −α0/2
−α0/2 α0/2
)
. (E1)
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where α0 ≥ 0 is a constant. This looks like a matrix de-
scribing a permutation symmetric model, although the
underlying model needs no such symmetry. The eigen-
values of α are 0 (corresponding to δq1 = δq2) and α0
(corresponding to δq1 = −δq2).
Let us begin by determining the expected number of
agents who will change state during an avalanche, where
a node changes state from 2 to 1. In this case, denoting
with Xi the expected number of agents who will change,
we conclude that X1 = −X2:(
X1
−X1
)
= (1−α)−1
(
1
−1
)
=
1
1− α0
(
1
−1
)
, (E2)
where we exploit the fact that this vector is an eigen-
vector of α. Indeed, α0 corresponds to what was simply
denoted α in [11] – the probability that a node will flip
its binary state in an avalanche.
It is also worth stressing that there is a dramatic sim-
plification in the study of avalanches (and complexity),
because all nodes in an avalanche will flip to the same
state. In fact, Eq. (93) boils down to a simple algebraic
equation, as the vector ξkl has only one component – ξ12.
We find that (
2
α0
− 2
)
ξ12 = 1, (E3)
which allows us to conclude, using Eq. (90), that
P(1, 2) =
α0
〈k〉 × 2ξ12 =
α20
(1− α0)〈k〉 , (E4)
which agrees with the result derived from Thouless-
Anderson-Palmer equations in [11].
Appendix F: An Introduction to SSB
Let us provide a brief reminder of what spontaneous
symmetry breaking (SSB) is. We say that our permu-
tation symmetric models have Sn (permutation) sym-
metry because, for any element σ ∈ Sn (σ is a bijec-
tive map from the set {1, . . . , n} to itself), the energy
E(q1, . . . , qn) = E(qσ(1), . . . , qσ(n)). Thus, a global re-
numbering of the choices does not alter the energy land-
scape. However, a typical point in the simplex breaks this
symmetry: in general, (q1, . . . qn) 6= (qσ(1), . . . , qσ(n)).
Only when qi = 1/n for every i, is the full symmetry
group present. This is called the permutation symmet-
ric point. We are interested in the cases where E has
Sn symmetry, but ~q at a minimum of E does not have
Sn symmetry – these phases are called symmetry broken
phases (we will often say SSB phase for shorthand).
It may turn out, however, that some subgroup of Sn is
preserved. For example, if q1 = q2 = · · · = qn−1 6= qn,
then so long as σ(n) = n, the permutation leaves the
value of ~q unchanged. This value of ~q preserves per-
mutation symmetry among n − 1 choices, so it has
Sn−1 symmetry. Alternatively, it may so happen that
q1 = q2 = · · · = qp 6= qp+1 = · · · = qn. Because here
any permutation σ that only swaps the first p elements
among themselves, and the last n − p elements among
themselves, is allowed, we say that the symmetry of this
state is Sp × Sn−p – we have two distinct permutation
symmetries.
This phenomenon is incredibly important. The fact
that E has Sn symmetry in a permutation symmetric
model means that every choice is identical on average.
SSB phases nonetheless pick out certain choices as “bet-
ter” than others – some qs are higher than others. The
occurence of SSB is a signature that social interactions
are playing a crucial role.
For a realistic social system, SSB may be “hard to ob-
serve” because the system may very well not have any
symmetry in the first place. There are two reasons why
SSB is nonetheless important. Firstly, the Sn symme-
try may be approximately present, and social interac-
tions overwhelm the small amount of intrinsic symme-
try breaking. Secondly, SSB phases in our toy models
are toy examples of phase transitions and social “herd-
ing” phenomenon caused entirely by interactions, which
probably do play a role in the real world. Thus, under-
standing what classes/instances of models are sensitive to
SSB provides us with insight into the (dramatic) effects
of interactions in collective decision making, in instances
where (because of symmetry) our analytic abilities are
much greater.
Appendix G: Stability of the Permutation
Symmetric Point in the Large n Limit
In this appendix we briefly discuss the stability of the
permutation symmetric fixed point as n increases. This
provides a simple answer to the question of whether more
choices enhances or suppresses SSB instability.
Let us begin by assuming that F (u) is given by a lo-
gistic distribution Eq. (A2) where β is fixed, and that
~f = ~q. Straightforward integrals give us that
α11 = −
∫
du F ′′Fn−1 =
β
n
n− 1
n+ 1
. (G1)
for the logistic distribution. We conclude from Eq. (63)
that the permutation symmetric fixed point is stable
when
β < n+ 1. (G2)
The more choices that are given, the harder it is for herd-
ing effects to take over, and for the permutation symme-
try to be broken.
In fact, this is nearly a generic result. To see this,
note that by deriving b (recall that when b > 1, the
permutation symmetric fixed point is unstable) from α12,
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it is straightforward to derive that
b(n)
n
=
∫
duF ′2Fn−2 >
∫
duF ′2Fn−1 =
b(n+ 1)
n+ 1
.
(G3)
We see that, up to the “mild” difference between n and
n + 1, we have b(n) & b(n + 1). No “reasonable” dis-
tribution F we have ever checked has b(n) ≤ b(n + 1)
for any n, although we have not been able to rule it out.
A heuristic explanation for this is the following: if there
are more choices, then it is more likely that people find a
choice that they feel strongly about. Thus, adding more
choices would stabilize the permutation symmetric fixed
point.
However, there is a rather straightforward scaling limit
in which increasing the number of choices n does not alter
stability: suppose that
β = β0n (G4)
Here we are still studying the logistic distribution. One
might argue that this is a more physical limit, in the
sense that as n→∞, there is an instability whenever
β0 < 1, (G5)
independently of n. This is one mechanism for allowing
an instability to persist with many choices.
This is rather ad hoc, for the simple reason that dif-
ferent distributions require different scaling limits to pre-
serve the stability of the symmetric point as n → ∞. A
particularly interesting example is the case where F (u)
corresponds to the uniform distribution:
F (u) =
 0 u < 0u/u0 0 < u < u01 u > u0 . (G6)
Assume that u0 does not change with n. One can check
rather easily for this distribution, from the definition of
αij , that
α11 = −
∫
du
u0
(δ(u)− δ(u− u0))F (u)n−1 = 1
u0
, (G7)
which implies that
b(n) =
n
n− 1
1
u0
. (G8)
So we see that whenever u0 < 1, there is an instability
in the n→∞ limit. This suggests a rather more robust
mechanism for preserving instabilities of the permutation
symmetric point in the n→∞ limit.
Appendix H: Details of the Landau Theory
Caclulation
We provide the computational details of the Landau
theory calculation, whose conclusion was summarized in
the main text.
1. Form of E
Our starting point is to verify that Eq. (64) is the
most general possible energy E up to O(δq4i ) consistent
with permutation symmetry, and the simplex constraint
that
∑
δqi = 0. A linear term cannot be included in E
since the only possible choice consistent with the symme-
try is proportional to the simplex constraint above. The
only quadratic terms allowed are
∑
δq2i and
∑
i 6=j δqiδqj
– again, using the simplex constraint, these turn out to
be proportional, so we simply choose the first one as it
is manifestly positive. The three cubic terms are given
by sums over
∑
i δq
3
i ,
∑
j 6=i δq
2
i δqj , or
∑
i 6=j 6=k δqiδqjδqk.
The first two terms are proportional for an analogous
reason to before; we then use the fact that(∑
i
δqi
)3
=
∑
i
δq3i + 3
∑
j 6=i
δq2i δqj + 6
∑
i 6=j 6=k
δqiδqjδqk
(H1)
vanishes to conclude that there is only a unique indepen-
dent cubic term, which we take to be
∑
i δq
3
i . Identical
arguments to these lead us to conclude that at quartic
order, there are two possible terms, as they are given in
Eq. (64).
2. The Minima of E
The assumption that there is a continuous phase tran-
sition requires that E be bounded from below. This is
satisfied if ψ > 0 and
ω
ψ
> −n
2 − 3n+ 3
(n− 1)n (H2)
or if ψ < 0 and
ω
|ψ| >
{
n(n2 − 1)/(n2 + 3) n odd
n n even
. (H3)
The most efficient way to find the minima of E is as
follows. Let us begin by fixing δq4, . . . , δqn. We will show
that given arbitrary δq4, . . . , δqn, at the local minimum
of E among δq1, . . . , δq3, two of these must be equal.
Since any global minimum of E must also correspond to
a minimum of E when constrained to this subspace, we
conclude that it is impossible to have any three i, j, k for
which δqi 6= δqj 6= δqk, in the minimum of Eq. (64).
Let us now prove the claim. The simplex constraint
implies that the sum δq1 + δq2 + δq3 ≡ 3η is also fixed.
Let us also define
δq1 = η + r cos θ, (H4a)
δq2 = η + r cos
(
θ +
2pi
3
)
, (H4b)
δq3 = η + r cos
(
θ +
4pi
3
)
. (H4c)
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Then the Landau energy is, up to a constant factor E0:
E = E0 − 3ζ
2
r2 +
9θ + 18ψ
8
r4 −
(
3ξ
4
− 3ηω
)
r3 cos(3θ).
(H5)
The minimum of E on this two dimensional subspace
corresponds to a point where two of the 3 s in question
equal each other. Since any global minimum of E must
also correspond to a minimum of E when constrained
to this subspace, we conclude that it is impossible to
have any three i, j, k for which δqi 6= δqj 6= δqk, in the
minimum of Eq. (64).
We conclude that the symmetry of the resulting mini-
mum, when ζ > 0, must preserve a Sp × Sn−p subgroup
of Sn: i.e.,
δqi =
{
/p i = 1, . . . , p
−/(n− p) i = p+ 1, . . . , n . (H6)
In fact, as the transition is discontinuous (as we will see
shortly), to understand the SSB transition it will suffice
to study the location of minima at ζ = 0. In this case,
plugging Eq. (H6) into our energy ansatz, we find
E = −ξ3
(
1
p2
− 1
(n− p)2
)
+ 4
(
ω
(
1
p3
+
1
(n− p)3
)
+ ψ
(
1
p
+
1
n− p
)2)
, (H7)
which has a minimum at energy
Ep,n = −3
3ξ4
44
(
1
p2
− 1
(n− p)2
)4(
ω
(
1
p3
+
1
(n− p)3
)
+ ψ
(
1
p
+
1
n− p
)2)−3
. (H8)
The fact that even at ζ = 0, Ep,n < 0 guarantees that
the transition is discontinuous. By differentiating Ep,n
with p, we can find the optimal value of p. It is clear
Ep,n = En−p,n, we focus on p < n/2. We find that Ep,n
is decreasing for p < p∗ and increasing for p > p∗, with
p∗ =
n
2
(
1−
√
ω + nψ
3ω + nψ
)
. (H9)
These results are universal and hold for arbitrary permu-
tation symmetric models which have an energy function
E.
3. Cooperative Decision Making
So far, our discussion has been entirely based on as-
sumptions of permutation symmetry alone – we have not
added any specific input about our decision model. Let
us consider ~f = ~q. Then all cubic and quartic contribu-
tions come from derivatives of G. Define
κijk ≡ ∂
3G
∂qi∂qj∂qk
, κijkl ≡ ∂
4G
∂qi∂qj∂qk∂ql
. (H10)
In what follows, we will denote with κ112 the value of any
coefficient of κijk with two indices equal, and the third
index different; all other κ coefficients follow analogous
definitions. By positivity of F and F ′, we see that κ123 <
0 and κ1234 > 0. Using constraints that
∑
k κijk = 0, we
conclude that κ112 > 0 and κ111 ∼ −ξ < 0. Analogous
to what we found for the αij matrix, κ111 is not directly
proportional to ξ, because the way we write out G, there
will be terms proportional to δqiδqjδqk, e.g. Accounting
for this properly, and using that 2κ123 = −(n − 2)κ112,
and κ111 = −(n− 1)κ112, we find that, for n > 2:
ξ =
|κ111|
6
(n− 4)(n− 2) + 3
(n− 1)(n− 2) > 0. (H11)
A similar calculation for the quartic case reveals that
ψ =
κ1122
8
+
2n− 3
12
κ1234 > 0, (H12a)
ω =
n
24
κ1122 − n
3 − 2n2 + 3n− 9
72
κ1234. (H12b)
Note that by construction, κ1122, κ1234 > 0. We conclude
that ψ > 0. If θ < 0, Eq. (H9) implies that the smallest
SSB phase has Sn−1 symmetry.15
In general, for unimodal F (u) distributions, we find nu-
merically ω < 0. We have found distributions for which
ω > 0 (e.g. Eq. (76) with n = 4, 5, u0 & 100, β = 1,
p = 0.5), yet we have found in these cases p∗ < 1.
In conclusion, we cannot rule out in principle that there
exist permutation symmetric models which directly un-
dergo a discontinuous phase transition from the Sn sym-
metric point to a Sp×Sn−p fixed point with p > 1, though
we have constrained it to this general form. For all prac-
tical examples we have found, however, p = 1, even in the
15 This constraint can be slightly relaxed. We simply need that
p∗ < 2, and that E1,n < E2,n.
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bimodal case. This suggests that the dominant pattern
of symmetry breaking is simply that one choice becomes
more popular, with all others remaining equal. Of course,
we have shown that far away from the ζ = 0 transition,
bimodal distributions can lead to further patterns of sym-
metry breaking – the Landau theory description is only
valid close to the permutation symmetric point.
Appendix I: Permutation Symmetry Breaking in the
Logistic Model
The Landau theory arguments are extremely generic,
but we are unable to completely prove, even for a uni-
modal distribution, that p∗ is small enough so that per-
mutation symmetry in a model with n choices is broken
only from Sn to Sn−1. In this appendix, we demonstrate
that near the SSB phase transition, the SSB pattern in
logistic models is indeed Sn to Sn−1. Logistic distribu-
tions are toy models of generic unimodal distributions,
as detailed in Appendix A. Since deep in the SSB phase
(β  n + 1) logistic models are well described by Eq.
(A7), this provides a rather complete justification of our
claim that this model never breaks permutation symme-
try beyond Sn−1.
Specifically, we will study the shape of the energy E,
and show that it cannot develop more than n minima.
This will be true if E has at most 3 minima in each
angular direction when the simplex is embedded in R2,
as illustrated in Fig. 11. Due to permutation symmetry,
we can just pick any angular coordinate θ and write E
as
E(R, θ) =
∞∑
k=0
a3k(R) cos(3kθ). (I1)
where R is proportional to the distance from the axis of
rotation of θ: see Subappendix I 1 for details on how to
find R and θ. Due to the D6 (dihedral) symmetry of
each 2-dimensional simplex, only Fourier modes of order
3k exist.
Any extremum of E occurs when
∂θE =
∞∑
k=1
3ka3k(R) sin(3kθ) = 0. (I2)
We wish to find the circumstances under which this equa-
tion cannot have any other root other than the six trivial
ones at θ = pin/3, for n = 1, . . . , 6. A sufficient condition
for this is
∞∑
k=2
k|a3k(R)| < 2
pi
a3(R). (I3)
To prove this, observe that, e.g. for |θ| < pi/6, we have
| sin(3x)| > (2/pi)3|x|, and | sin(3nx)| < 3n|x|; we then
split up the sum Eq. (I2) into the n = 1 piece and the
n > 1 piece, and apply these bounds to each side. By
symmetry, an analogous argument holds for the other 5
regions of the circle 0 ≤ θ < 2pi.
Hence to show that the SSB pattern is Sn → Sn−1, we
just have to show that Eq. (I3) is satisfied within some
finite distance r∗ from the permutation symmetric point;
it will turn out that r∗ ∼ 10/β, which implies that the
spontaneously broken minima favor one choice until β is
large (at which point Eq. (A7) is valid).
The decay rate of ak(R), the Fourier coefficients of
E(R, θ), is controlled by the complex analytic properties
of E(R, z) where z = eiθ. From Eq. (I20) in Section I 2,
the coefficients decay like
|a3k(R)|
|a3(k−1)(R)| ∼ |z0|
3 (I4)
where z0 is the closest singularity of E(R, z) from the
unit circle such that |z0| < 1. While Eq. (I4) only holds
asymptotically in the large k limit, we numerically find
for the logistic models it is accurate to ≈ 15% for |a6|/|a3|
and ≈ 2.5% for |a9|/|a6| as shown in Fig. 10. Henceforth,
we shall keep track of the largest discrepancy via the
parameter c = |a3||z0|
3
|a6| ≈ 1.
E differs from G by a trivial quadratic factor from
G, whose functional form of is given by Eq. (A3) with
αk = e
βqk , β being the market heterogeneity. As ex-
plained previously, singularities only occur when denom-
inator eβqi − eβqj = 0 and qi 6= qj . This occurs when
qi(R, θ)− qj(R, θ) = 2piip
β
, (I5)
for i 6= j and p a non-zero integer. Expressions for qi and
qj may be found using Eq. (I17). Due to permutation
symmetry, we are free to choose any pair i, j. It turns
out that i = n− 1, j = n gives the cleanest computation:
qn−1 − qn = 2(n− 1)
n
xn−1
n−2∏
j=1
Sj
=
2r(n− 1)
n
√
n
2(n− 1)
n−2∏
j=1
sinϕj
=
2R(n− 1)
n
√
n
2(n− 1) sin θ
=
2piip
β
(I6)
where we have used S2k = 1 − (n − k)−2 from lines 1 to
2, and identified R sin θ with r
∏n−2
j=1 sinϕj in line 3 (see
Section I 1). Analytically continuing θ to z = eiθ, the
above reduces to
−
√
2n
n− 1
2pip
βR
=
(
z − 1
z
)
(I7)
whose root z0 closest to the unit circle gives us the decay
rate of |ak(R)|.
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Combining Eqs. (I4) and (I3), the condition for Sn →
Sn−1 is
2c
pi
>
∞∑
k=1
(k + 1)|z0|3k, (I8)
which leads to
|z0|−3 > 1 + pi
2c
(
1 +
√
1 +
2c
pi
)
≈ 4 + 3(1− c). (I9)
With
|z0| =
√
1 +
2n
n− 1
(
pip
βR
)2
−
√
2n
n− 1
pip
βR
, (I10)
we obtain
R
p
=
2pi
β
√
2n
n− 1
|z0|
1− |z0|2
. 8 + 4(c− 1)
β
√
n
n− 1 (I11)
where we have also used Eq. (I9). This inequality must
hold for all values of p and angular variables; in par-
ticular, for p = 1 and R = r when the LHS is max-
imal. As previously mentioned, the error |c − 1| =∣∣|a3||z0|3/|a6| − 1∣∣ ∼ 0.1, so we conclude that E is broken
as Sn → Sn−1 for
r < r∗ ≈ 8
β
√
n
n− 1 (I12)
For β ∼ O(1), r∗ > 1 and we have Sn → Sn−1 for the
entire configuration space. But we also know that the
same SSB pattern occurs in the β →∞.
1. Barycentric coordinates for ~q in Rn−1.
As we have done before in Eq. (36), we will want
to find an embedding of ~q onto the (n − 1)-dimensional
simplex in Rn−1. The most straightforward way to do
this is to write
~x =
n∑
k=1
qk~bk, (I13)
where ~x and ~bk are (n− 1)-dimensional (linearly depen-
dent) basis vectors, normalized so that
~bk ·~bj = n
n− 1δjk −
1
n− 1 . (I14)
Geometrically, the bks give the positions of the vertices of
the simplex, and are at angle of arccos(−1/(n− 1)) from
one another. We will wish to choose the point ~x = ~0
corresponds to the permutation symmetric point. Intu-
itively, the bks should point towards the vertices of the
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
r
50
100
150
200
ratios
FIG. 10: Comaparison between the numerically computed
|a3k|/|a3(k+1)| for k = 1(blue), k = 2 (red), and its theoret-
ical prediction |z0|−3 (green), all at β = 4. We see that the
ratios are much greater than one, which suggests that higher
harmonics leading to additional SSB are strongly suppressed.
The numerically computed ratio of |f3/f6| = c|z0|−3, where c
differs from unity by less than 15%. The ratio between suc-
cessive harmonics like |f6/f9| is almost indistinguishable from
the complex analytic result.
-0.5 0.0
0.5
x1
-0.5
0.0
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-0.5
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0.5
x3
FIG. 11: The profile of G for n = 4, β = 40. The distance
from the origin represents the magnitude of G at a chosen
r = 0.8. S3 symmetry is evident from the “tetrahedral” lobes.
simplex representing the various choices, and should be
all ion symmetric point. A basis consistent with all the
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above requirements is
~b1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), (I15a)
~b2 = (C1, S1, . . . , 0), (I15b)
~b3 = (C1, S1C2, S1S2, . . . , 0), (I15c)
...
~bn−1 = (C1, S1C2, S1S2C3, . . . , S1 · · ·Sn−2), (I15d)
~bn = (C1, S1C2, S1S2C3, . . . ,−S1 · · ·Sn−2), (I15e)
with
Ck = − 1
n− k , S
2
k + C
2
k = 1. (I16)
Note that, given the simplex constraint Eq. (2), we can
easily check that
~qk =
1
n
+
n− 1
n
~x ·~bk. (I17)
and that
|~x|2 = n
n− 1
n∑
k
(
qk − 1
n
)2
(I18)
For the purposes of this Appendix, we will also need to
express ~x explicitly in terms of angles in orgin-centered
spherical coordinates, analogously to the n = 3 case:
x1 = r cosϕ1, (I19a)
x2 = r sinϕ1 cosϕ2, (I19b)
...
xn−2 = r cosϕk
n−3∏
k=1
sinϕk, (I19c)
xn−1 = r
n−2∏
k=1
sinϕk. (I19d)
2. Proof of the Decay of Fourier Coefficients
Here we prove that the fourier coefficients ak of a peri-
odic function E(z), where z = eiθ, decay asymptotically
like
|ak| ∼ λk (I20)
up to a proportionality factor, where λ = |z0| < 1, with
z0 is the closest singularity of E(z) from the unit circle
with |z|0 < 1. In particular, there is a constant C such
that ak < Cλ
k. This result is well-known [54, 55], but
here we shall provide a simpler derivation suitable for our
context. Recall the definition that
E(z) =
∑
k≥0
ak
2
(
zk +
1
zk
)
(I21)
Since E(z) is analytic for |z| > |z0| within the unit circle,
the above series must converge in that region. As Eq.
(I20) must hold for some value of λ for this series to
converge at all inside the unit circle, let us assume this
holds and determine the required value of λ. When λ <
|z| < 1:
E(z) <
∑
k≥0
|ak|
|z|k < C
∑
k≥0
∣∣∣∣λz
∣∣∣∣k <∞ (I22)
In addition, E(z) fails to be analytic at z0, so the above
series must diverge when |z| = λ. Evidently, |z0| = λ.
This implies that |ak| must asymptotically decay as |z0|k,
proving Eq. (I20).
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